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ABSTRACT
This thesis which compromise of three essays focuses on the theme of
valuation, value premium anomaly, financing behaviour and emerging
markets. The first essay studies the value growth puzzle in the context of
conflict of interest between taxable and institutional investors. We model this
conflict in a rational expectations framework and demonstrate how the
differences in firm's characteristics (in terms of value versus growth) and the
risk profile of the investors can explain the shape of CAPM's frontier in the
overall economy without involving the beta parameter. We also explicate
that the changes in taxable and non-taxable investors profile in a dynamic
environment rationalize the value growth premium as illustrated by Malkiel
(2003). Finally, our approach shed light on the issues raised by Shiller
(1979,1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981) that stock [bond] prices are too
volatile to be rationalized by the discounted value of their expected dividends
[coupon payments].
The second essay studies value anomaly in the context of four major
emerging economies (i.e. Brazil, Turkey, China and India denoted by the
acronym BTIC) with vast economic potential and Malaysia, a small emerging
economy with top heavy, closely held, state-owned institutional setting. We
attribute the anomaly to the investment pattern of glamour firms. Our
empirical analysis illustrates that these firms have a tendency to hoard cash,
delaying the undertaking of their growth options, especially in poor economic
environments. This mitigates their business risk, but lowers their market
valuation, driving down their returns. Our hypothesis also reconciles the
diverging views stemming from both the neoclassical and behavioural
perspectives.
This third essay examines the target capital structure of Malaysian
firms and their adjustment process in the pre- and post- Asian financial crisis.
We utilize an unbalanced panel data set comprising of 184 firms and employ
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to study the relationship
between a firm's characteristics and its capital structure targeting behaviour
in the context of political patronage. Our results support the amalgamation of
the well-known Pecking Order and Static Trade-off theories. It also
illustrates that the financial crisis had a significant impact on the financial
policy of Malaysian firms.
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CHAPTER ONE
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND
Theories of finance are centred around the concept of value
maximisation. In a nutshell, this is how the economic agents aim to
maximise the value of resources available to them through time by interacting
with the existence of capital market and firms (Fama and Miller, 1972).
Based on this rationale, many theories have been developed but two of the
most frequently discussed in finance literature are the portfolio and capital
structure theories. Portfolio theory is mainly concerned with how individuals
construct an optimal portfolio that maximises their expected utility of wealth,
i.e., the combination of securities that give them the highest level of return for
the given level of risk. Meanwhile, capital structure theory addresses the
issue on how firms finance their assets, in particular whether the financing
methods have any effect on the value of firms. Although, these two theories
were developed separately, Hamada (1969) and Rubinstein (1973)
demonstrate the connection between these two in term of a unified approach
to the cost of capital.
Despite the voluminous amount of the articles analysing and
advancing these two theories, several issues remain controversial and
unresolved. In the case of portfolio theory, one of the main issues is the
1
inability of the asset pricing model to price risky assets. Specifically, the
fallacy of Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to quantify risk accordingly,
leading to inaccurate valuation of risky asset, thus suboptimal allocation of
financial resources. Despite having a sound theoretical argument, CAPM
does not have strong empirical backing. The basic notion of CAPM in which
beta (systematic risk) is the sole explanatory of risk does not seem to be
supported by empirical observations. This is based on the accumulated
weight of evidence on stock market anomalies, implying that there are factors
apart from beta which have explanatory power to capture risk and explain
return. This leads to the conclusion that CAPM with beta alone may not be a
complete model, resulting in the development of a new form of CAPM with a
variety of assumptions.
One of the many anomalies that question the validity of CAPM is the
value premium puzzle. That is, where value stocks (high book-to-market)
earn significantly higher risk-adjusted return compared to glamour stocks
(low book-to-market). The evidence of the value premium is compelling,
particularly in developed markets. Nevertheless, the source of it remains
contentious despite several reasonable explanations that have been put
forward. For instance, the advocates of rational pricing attribute the source of
value premium to an additional risk factor. In contrast, behavioural
researchers explicate that the cognitive biases of undervaluing value stocks
and overvaluing glamour stocks leads to the premium in value. stocks.
Meanwhile, there are some studies that accredit the value premium to the
firm's characteristics or methodological issues.
2
In the case of capital structure, the debate highlighting the theory
behind a finn's financial behaviour is an intriguing one. On the one hand, the
Static Trade-Off theory predicts that firms aim to have a capital structure that
balances between the benefit and cost of debt. That is, achieving an optimal
financing level that balances the benefits that arise from interest tax shield
and a reduction of free cash flow problem with costs that include the agency
cost of debt and potential bankruptcy cost. On the other hand, the Pecking
Order theory posits that firms' financing follows a hierarchy of instruments
that minimises asymmetric information, Finns prefer retained earnings as a
source of financing, followed by debt and external equity as the last resort.
The question of which theory is more dominant remains an elusive matter.
The other issue that has been largely under explored is research in the
context of emerging economies. It is usually the case that empirical evidence
provided in finance literature is based on developed markets, particularly
from North America and Europe. The main assumption behind this rationale
is the fact that these markets are considered to be efficient and provide
reasonable data to test any new theories. There is also widespread belief
among some academics and even practitioners that evidence from developed
markets can be generalised and applied to developing markets. Nonetheless,
this argument does not take into account the considerable differences between
these two markets. For instance, many developed countries practice an
economic system that is based on a "market-based" approach. In contrast,
developing countries mainly practice a "relationship-based" economic
system. Moreover, the developed markets are better regulated compared to
3
developing markets. As a result, there is a need to understand the application
of finance theories in the context of emerging market.
1.2 MOTIVATIONS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This research is aimed at addressing these issues. Using relevant
theoretical and empirical methodologies with publicly available data from
several emerging countries, this thesis which compromise of three essays
focuses on the theme of valuation, value premium anomaly, financing
behaviour and emerging markets.
The objective of the first essay is to provide a new theoretical
framework to study the value growth puzzle. Meanwhile, the second essay
aims to rationalise the value premium with economic fundamentals by
reconciling the conflicting views in the neoclassical and behavioural
literature. Finally, the third essay studies the impact of the financial crisis on
firms' financing behaviour, particularly examining the issue of target capital
structure and its adjustment process.
The first essay focuses on the theme of valuation and anomaly. The
major issue that it addresses is the inability of existing asset pricing models
particularly CAPM to accurately price value and growth stocks. Value stocks
tend to be undervalued and vice versa for growth stocks, consequently
leading to value premium anomaly. Unlike previous studies, this essay brings
a new insight to asset pricing literature by taking into consideration the
heterogeneity of economic agents. That is, the rivalry between taxable and
4
non-taxable investors in determining the optimal stakeholders of a firm. To
do so, the essay not only attempts to provide a new theoretical framework to
price value and growth stocks but also to provide answers to whether the
rivalry between these two agents can explicate the fallacy of CAPM, explain
value growth anomaly and shed light on the issue of stock price volatility.
Motivated by the findings of the first essay, the second essay aims to
provide empirical analysis on the value premium anomaly by rationalising it
to economic fundamentals. This study aim is to investigate whether
investment patterns of growth firms can possibly explain value premium
anomaly. Using several methodologies with data from five emerging
markets: Brazil, China, India, Turkey and Malaysia, this essay has two sub-
objectives. First, to ascertain the existence of value premium in these five
markets and second to test whether our economic intuition can rationalise the
presence of value premium. Furthermore, it attempts to reconcile not only the
conflicting views within the neoclassical asset pricing literature but also
between the neoclassical and behavioural literature.
Meanwhile, the third and final essay explores the link between capital
structure and financial crisis. In particular, it examines the target capital
structure of Malaysian firms and its adjustment process in the pre- and post-
Asian financial crisis. Moreover, it also investigates the relationship between
a firm's characteristics and capital structure targeting behaviour, mainly in the
context of political patronage. Utilising an unbalanced panel data set and
employing Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) this essay specifically
addresses two research issues: (i) did the Asian financial crisis have a
significant impact on Malaysian firms' financing policy? (ii) are there any
5
distinct features in terms of financing policy between firms with and without
political patronage?
1.3 CONTRIBUTIONS
This section presents the contributions of this thesis to finance
literature. The first essay enhances the existing framework of asset pricing
models with the incorporation of heterogeneity of economic agents. This is
important as the existing models do not address the issue of diversity of
individual's opinions or expectations to achieve a natural idea of equilibrium
(see Kirman, 1992). This, in tum, provides a new dimension to price
financial assets.
This essay also shows how the shape of true CAPM's frontier in the
overall economy without involving the beta parameter can be explained by:
(i) the rivalry of two economic agents (taxable and non-taxable) in a rational
expectations framework, (ii) the differences in firms' characteristics (in terms
of value and growth) and (iii) the risk profile of the investors. In doing so,
the fallacy of theoretical CAPM in predicting the true relationship between
risk and return is explicated. It also demonstrates that the changes in taxable
and non-taxable investors' profiles in a dynamic environment rationalises the
value growth premium as illustrated by Malkiel (2003). Finally, the essay
also sheds light on the issues raised by Shiller (1979,1981) and LeRoy and
Porter (1981) that stock [bond] prices are too volatile to be rationalised by the
discounted value of their expected dividends [coupon payments].
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The second essay of this research contributes to the literature by
attributing the value premium anomaly to the investment pattern of growth
firms. The empirical analysis reveals that growth firms are likely to employ a
strategy of stockpiling capital, particularly in less favourable economic
conditions. Whilst this limits their exposure to risk, it negatively impacts on
both their market valuation and their returns, thus contributing to the value
premium. This essay also makes another important contribution in linking
the risk- and characteristics-based models, thus, reconciling the diverging
neoclassical views of Fama and French (1995) and Daniel and Titman (1997).
This was done by demonstrating that distress risk is not the main cause for the
wide spread in expected return between value and growth stocks but rather
the risk of a firm's unique characteristics. That is, glamour firms are being
endowed with growth options that entail capital outlay resulting in business
risk, while in contrast, value firms have fixed assets that are used as collateral
to lever up and boost their earnings, resulting in financial risk.
A further contribution is the reconciliation of the diverging
neoclassical and behavioural perspectives, by utilising the Rational
Expectations perspective of Lucas «(1978); and extended by Sargent (1987)),
in which the inherent utility of glamour firms is attractive to investors,
causing their price to be increased through bidding, though with the effect of
subsequently reducing their returns.
The third and final essay exammes the target capital structure of
Malaysian firms and its adjustment process in the pre- and post- Asian
financial crisis. The essay enhances our understanding of firms' financing
behaviour in the context of an emerging economy, with political patronage
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considered. The essay demonstrates that the financial crisis has had a
significant impact on the financial policy of Malaysian firms. This is
indicated by the higher adjustment rate towards the optimal capital structure
and conservative approach to financing in the aftermath of the Asian financial
crisis. Also, the essay shows the distinct impact of the crisis on firms with
and without political patronage. Last but not least, the empirical analysis
supports the amalgamation of the well-known Pecking Order and Static
Trade-off Theories.
1.4 THESIS STRUCTURE AND SUMMARY OF ESSAY'S
CONTENT
This thesis consists of three essays in finance, two on portfolio theory and one
on capital structure theory, whose content is briefly described below:
1.4.1 Value versus Growth: A Theoretical Exposition
The first essay examines the issue of value premium anomaly in a
theoretical framework. It studies how the rivalry between taxable and non-
taxable investors determines the optimal stakeholders of a firm which
ultimately impacts on the value of its debt and equity. We model this rivalry
in a rational expectation economy where investors behave rationally in the
process of acquiring and processing of information and to the formation of
expectations (see Maddock and Carter, 1982). This is consistent with the
notion of Efficient Market Hypothesis where prices reflect all the relevant
information. The economy also consists of two types of firms (value versus
8
growth) and an exogenous entity called government. This approach allows us
to generate the following results.
The differences in firms characteristics (in terms of value versus
growth) and the risk profile of agents in the economy leads to the domination
of one agent over the other over the control of the firm, yielding two different
Capital Market Lines (CMLs). The shape of the true CMLs depends on the
identity of the dominant agent in the overall economy. If the dominant agent
is taxable investors, then a flatter line will be observed in the overall
economy, and vice versa. This verifies the observation of many empirical
studies that the relation between beta and average returns is flatter than
predicted by the theoretical CAPM. Consequently, the continuous changes in
the identity of net lenders in a dynamic environment rotate the aggregate
frontier, demonstrating a value growth premium and changing the volatility
of stocks and bonds. In a nutshell, the essay highlights the fact that in an
economy with competing taxable and non-taxable agents, asset pricing is
contingent on the classification of firm (value versus growth) and the risk
profile of investors.
1.4.2 Rationalising the Value Premium under Economic
Fundamentals: Evidence from Emerging Economies
The second essay provides empirical analysis of value premium
anomaly. Even though this issue has been elaborated extensively in the
literature, there is no economic justification given to rationalise the source of
value premium. Therefore, this essay extends the literature by attributing
value anomaly to economic fundamentals, i.e. the investment pattern of
9
growth firms, leading to reconciliation of diverging views not only within
neoclassical but also between neoclassical and behavioural perspectives.
The essay uses data from five emergmg countries obtained from
DataStream and employs various econometrics methods: Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS), Rolling Regression and the Panel Data estimation technique.
The choice of each method simply reflects the research questions that the
study intends to investigate. The various analyses undertaken generate the
following results.
First, the essay confirms the existence of a significant value premium
in all countries but India. Second, the essay provides evidence confirming
our economic intuition that the source of the value premium is in the
investment pattern of glamour firms. This is through the observations of the
coefficients (HML-high minus low) of growth portfolios which are generally
lower during the early growth periods, but increase considerably during the
periods of expansion, implying that glamour firms delay the adoption of new
strategies in periods of high economic uncertainty, in order to limit their risk.
Moreover, the panel data analysis suggests that the increment in total assets -
which in the context of this essay is the proxy for undertaking growth options
- explains the changes in business risk of glamour firms, further reaffirming
our economic intuition. A careful consideration of these results leads to
reconciliation of diverging views on the source of value premium within the
literature.
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1.4.3 Dynamic Capital Structure under Political Patronage: A
Pre- and Post- Crisis Analysis of Malaysia.
The third and final essay examines the issue of firms financing it the
context of Malaysia, an emerging economy where political patronage plays a
role. It considers the impact of the 1997 Asian financial crisis on the
financing policy of Malaysian firms (with and without political patronage) by
examining the determinants of the optimal capital structure and its adjustment
process. This research is relevant as sub-optimal financial choices may lower
firms' value or exposes them to bankruptcy.
This essay uses data of 184 firms from 1988 to 2009 which is split
into two periods, i.e. from 1988 to 1997 representing the pre-crisis period,
and 2000 to 2009 representing the post-crisis period. The essay does not
include the data during the crisis period as it is extremely noisy. We employ
the dynamic GMM system estimator developed by Arellano and Bover
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) as it accounts for unobserved firm
heterogeneity and addresses the problem of weak instruments. The validity
of our estimation is subject to the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions,
and Arellano-Bond for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors. We
also check the robustness of our results using the GMM difference estimator
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). There are two key results that
emerged from our analysis.
First, Malaysian managers recognise the importance of prudent
financing policy. This is indicated by the higher adjustment rate towards
optimal capital structure during post-crisis period. Moreover, the changes in
11
coefficients for certain determinants provide evidence that these firms have
adopted a more conservative approach to financing. For instance, even firms
with stable earnings chose to have lower leverage in the aftermath of financial
CrISIS. These findings are applicable for firms irrespective of ownership
structure (i.e., with or without political connection). Second, the findings
facilitate the amalgamation of the well-known Pecking Order and Static
Trade-off theories, as signified by the negative relationship between
profitability and debt and significant partial adjustment process.
12
CHAPTER2
2. VALUE VERSUS GROWTH: A
THEORETICAL EXPOSITION
2.1 INTRODUCTION
"In our view, the fact that asset prices appear to fluctuate more
than is consistent with most financial model in current use should
be regarded as a major challenge to those models. "
(LeRoy and Porter, 1981, pp. 559)
The inability of financial intermediaries to price their "toxic" assets
(in the form of collateralized debt obligations) in the ongoing subprime crisis
has exposed the weakness of modem asset pricing theories. I This crisis has
reignited the issues raised earlier by Shiller (1979, 1981) and LeRoy and
Porter (1981) that stock [bond] prices are too volatile to be rationalized by the
discounted values of their expected dividends [coupon payments]. This issue
is of utmost importance not only for valuation but for a host of issues ranging
I. Subprime mortgage constitutes home loans to borrowers with sketchy credit history or
to those who are financially strapped or lack adequate income to qualify for a standard
(prime) loan. They are thus lower in quality to prime loans. The subprime crisis was
provoked by:(i) underwriting of negatively amortizing Adjustable Rate Mortgages
(ARMs - with low "teaser" rates) at the peak of the real estate market.; (ii) coupled with
the ad hoc structuring of continuously changing pool of underlying Mortgage Backed
securities (MBS) into opaque collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) which
endogenized leverage amongst various "tranches" (akin to a multi-purpose closed-end
fund); (iii) in a deregulated environment (see Wachter, 2008).
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from portfolio management to executive compensation (in shareholder value
analysis).
This essay studies how the rivalry between taxable and non-taxable
institutions determines the optimal stakeholders of a firm. This ultimately
impacts on the value of its debt and equity. This issue is currently being
reinforced in the literature of optimal asset location and allocation (see
Bergstresser and Poterba 2004; Dammon et al. 2004; Shoven and Sialm,
2004; Garlappi and Huang, 2006; Gomes et al. 2006).2 We explicate the
importance of the conflict of interest between the taxable and non-taxable
investors especially when it leads to the violation of the assumptions of
homogeneous expectations of investors and thus the breakdown of the two-
fund separation theorem of Tobin (1958). This, in tum, invalidates the linear
pricing scheme of stocks and bonds integrating the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM) with a firm's capital structure as developed by Hamada
(1969). Further elaboration of this issue is described below in the context of
the rich asset pricing literature.
The seminal study of Markowitz (1952) elaborates the advantages of
diversification. Tobin (1958) extended this to demonstrate the well-known
two-fund separation theorem. That is, the efficient set of investment for any
investor is a combination of a risk-free asset (involving lending or borrowing)
and the market portfolio. Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965a, b) and Mossin
2. Our approach can be construed as an extension of the well-known studies of Brennan
(1970) and Auerbach and King (1983) with a major difference. These earlier papers
studied the impact of taxes on the Capital Asset Pricing Model by focusing on a
"representative" agent who faced differential taxes on income and capital gains. We,
however, focus on how two agents compete in an economy to own different stakeholder
claims. This issue is of import as notable scholars such as Grossman and Shiller (1981)
have found it difficult to elaborate the volatility of stock prices by resorting to taxes.
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(1966) shaped these ideas further to the static CAPM where: (i) they
quantified the risk of an asset in terms of beta; and (ii) demonstrated the
relation between the risk (beta) and the return (see Fama and French, 2004;
and Perold, 2004). The static CAPM is based on a simplified framework of
idealistic assumptions where the risk of an asset is a function of the
covariance of its return with the market return.' It also states that the relation
between risk and return is linear indicating that high risk will earn high
return.
Over the past decades, the validity of static CAPM has been tested on
two issues: (i) beta is the sole explanatory variable; (ii) beta is positively and
linearly related to asset return. The early empirical studies investigate these
issues by focusing on the precise estimation of beta and validate the linear
relationship between beta and asset return (See Blume, 1970; Friend and
Blume, 1970; Black et aI., 1972; and Fama and MacBeth, 1973). Ironically,
despite the sound theoretical support, the static CAPM has never been
observed empirically (See Douglas, 1970; Blume and Friend, 1970; Black et
aI., 1972; Miller and Scholes, 1972; Reinganum, 1981; and Lakonishok and
Shapiro, 1986; Fama and French, 1992). Consequently, new versions of
CAPM emerged with a variety of assumptions. Among the noteworthy
include incorporating: (i) liquidity or non-marketability risk (Mayers, 1973;
3. The assumptions behind the CAPM are as follows:
(a) Economic agents (i.e., investors) are risk averse and maximize their expected
utility of wealth in a mean variance framework, where they have identical
estimates of expected return and standard deviation.
(b) Agents operate in a perfect capital market. That is, agents are not subject to any
transaction costs, taxes and short selling constraints.
(c) No agent dominates over the other in our framework.
(d) Agents can borrow or lend at a risk-free rate ofretum.
(e) Agents have the same one-period horizon and make their investment decision
concurrently.
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Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and
Pedersen, 2005; and Liu, 2006); (ii) restricted borrowing (Black, 1972); (iii)
foreign securities with exchange rate risk (Solnick, 1974; Grauer et al., 1976;
Senbet, 1979); (iv) dynamic investment strategy (Merton, 1973; and Breeden,
1979); (v) heterogeneous beliefs (Lintner, 1969); (vi) dynamic betas and
market risk premium (Jagannathan and Wang,1996); (vii) expected return as
return measurement (Pettengill et al., 1995); (viii) taxes (Brennan, 1970; and
Auerbach and King, 1983); (ix) time varying betas and asymmetric effects of
news (Cho and Engle, 2000); (x) decomposed beta (Campbell and
Vuolteenaho, 2004) and (xi) entrepreneurial risk (Heaton and Lucas, 2000).
Nonetheless, CAPM is still perceived as a fragile model based on the
accumulated weight of the evidence from earlier studies on stock market
anomalies (see Stattman, 1980; Banz, 1981; Basu, 1977, 1983; Rosenberg et
al., 1985; Bhandari, 1988; Jaffe et al., 1989; Lakonishok et al., 1994; Barbee
et al., 1996; and Fama and French, 1996). These studies illustrate that a
firm's average stock return not only relates to the systematic risk but also to
its size, book-to-market equity, earnings/price (E/P), sales/price, cash
flow/price, leverage and past sales growth." Adding strength to this claim,
studies like DeBondt and Thaler (1985) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)
find patters in average stock returns. While the former find a reversal in stock
return (termed as contrarian strategy), the latter discover that stocks with high
return in the past tend to have high return in the future (termed as momentum
4. For instance, Fama and French (1992, 1996) and Lakonishok et a1. (1994) find that
firms (in the United States) with high ratios of book-to market (B/M) and cash flow to
price (C/P) have higher average return than firms with low BIM and C/P). Adding to
this, several studies on international markets corroborate these findings (see Chan et al.,
1991; Capaul et al., 1993; and Fama and French, 1998).
16
strategy). Most importantly, Fama and French (1992) posit that CAPM has
no predictive power when beta is used alone. These findings fly in the face of
the CAPM theory.
The preceding paragraphs highlight the fallacy of CAPM which is one
of the crucial issues in asset pricing literature. The other issue which is of
import (in the context of current literature) is the value versus growth puzzle.
That is, value investing outperforms growth investing in general. However,
there are periods where growth outperforms value (see Davis et al., 2000;
Malkiel, 2003; Chan and Lakonishok, 2004; and Kelleher, 2006). What is so
puzzling about this phenomenon is the absence of consensus rationalizing the
difference between the performance of value and growth stocks.
Notwithstanding, two main theories have been put forth to explain the
value versus growth puzzle: (i) rational pricing; and (ii) overreaction
hypothesis. Rational pricing is based on argument that the existing model
fails to capture the missing risk factor of financial distress firms (see Fama
and French 1992, 1993 and 1996).5 In contrast, the overreaction hypothesis
asserts that cognitive biases of investors in undervaluing the distress stocks
and overvalues growth stocks leading to premium in value stocks (see
Lakonishok et al., 1994; Haugen, 1995; and Chan and Lakonishok, 2004).
However, there are numerous studies that contest the above theories based on
5. The Fama and French (1992, 1993 and 1996) analysis can be construed as an
agglomeration of that Basu (1977-involving PIE ratio) and Banz (1981-involving size of
the firm). This is because the Fama and French three factor model incorporate size
premium (in accordance with Banz, 1981), high and low book to market premium (in
accordance with Basu, 1977 -because book to market ratio accumulates the earnings
with the original stock par value normalized with the stock price) in addition to the
market premium (in accordance with the static CAPM).
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the methodological issues such as data snooping and survivorship bias (see
Kothari et al., 1995; Ball et al., 1995; and Conrad et al., 2003).
Although several researchers have studied these two issues separately,
no one to the best of our knowledge has attempted to synthesize these two
issues from a neo-classical perspective. Thus, the purpose of this study is to
explicate the value versus growth puzzle in the context of the conflict of
interest between taxable and non-taxable investors." The intuition behind our
approach stems from the fact that tax heterogeneity segregates investors into
two groups with different portfolio frontiers as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Non-
taxable agent prefers to maximize pre-tax returns, while taxable agent prefers
to maximize after tax returns. This demarcates the efficient frontier into two
distinct ones implying heterogeneous expectations.' Even though, this
violates the basic assumption of CAPM of homogenous expectations leading
to a unique tangential (market portfolio), we argue in line with Roll (1977)
that a single ex-ante efficient market portfolio comprising of all assets is not
possible to illustrate in the context of our model. 8 Thus, our analysis
illustrates more than one efficient frontier based on agent's tax liability.
6. We do not dwell into small versus large stocks as this is captured in the liquidity
premium literature (see Amihud and Mendelson, 1986 and Liu, 2006). That is, small
stocks are less liquid and hence require higher return. From a different perspective,
Manuelli and Sargent (1987) demonstrate that small stocks generate higher return as
they provide zero utility in the form of boasting rights to investors.
7. Our logic is in agreement with that of Kirman (1992) which states that financial market
models need to address the issue of diversity of individual's opinions or expectations to
achieve a natural idea of equilibrium. This is also consistent with our earlier argument
that heterogeneous expectations invalidate the two-fund separation theorem.
8. Roll (1977) shows CAPM cannot be tested as the market portfolio cannot be observed.
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Figure 2.1: Two Distinct Efficient Frontiers Illustrate the Breakdown of
the Tobin (1958) "Two Fund Separation Theorem"
Along this line, we model the conflict between these two competing
taxable and non-taxable agents in a rational expectations economy, where
there are two types of firms (value versus growth) and an exogenous entity
called government." 10 The "value" firm is basically a firm in a mature sector
of the economy, where it has no (or limited) access to "growth" options
requiring investment. Its operating cash flows are utilized to payoff its debt
and a substantial amount of dividend to its equity owners. In contrast, the
"growth" firm operates in a sector of the economy where it has access to a
number of "growth" options, which require funding. The "growth" firm
finances these investments with its operating cash flows instead of debt as it
finds agency costs of debt to be high (see Barclay et al. 2006).
9. We choose a setting involving symmetric information, as equilibrium asset prices
aggregate and reveal private information (see Grossman and Stiglitz, 1976, and 1980).
Thus, capital market participants can easily capture any private information held by
counterparty by observing their trading patterns. This is a result of the Efficient Market
Hypothesis (EMH-see Fama, 1970,1991; Bray, 1992; Sheffrin, 1996; Malkiel, 2003).
10. Maddock and Carter (1982) define rational expectations as "the application of the
principle of rational behaviour to the acquisition and processing of information and to
the formation of expectations". Bray (1992) explain it further by classifying rational
expectations equilibrium as "self-fulfilling" as economic agents form correct
expectations given the pricing model and information.
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The finance literature distinguishes value versus growth in term of
book-to-market (BIM) (see Capaul et al. 1993), cash flow-to-price (C/P) (see
Lakonishok et al. 1994) price-to-earning (PIE) (see Basu, 1977); and dividend
yield (see Keppler, 1991; and Fama and French, 2001). Thus, finn's with
high (B/M), high (C/P), low (PIE) and high dividend yield are regarded as
value stocks and vice versa. I I In this essay, we regard value stocks as paying
higher dividends than growth stocks. This logic is based on growth finn's
preference to finance their "growth" options using internally generated funds
instead of debt or external equity to minimize the agency cost of debt and
floatation costs of external equity (see Barclay et al. 2006).12 Thus, growth
stocks have very limited resources in the form of dividends to payout to its
equity owners.
The difference in finn's characteristics (in terms of value versus
growth) and the risk profile of agents in the economy leads to one type of
agent dominating the other for the control of the finn. This occurs when one
type of agent owns a larger fraction of equity in the finn using leverage
supplied by the other. In other words, our framework involves endogenous
use of leverage amongst the groups of agents. That is, it avoids the use of
short term government debt as it does not constitute wealth but the debt of
society in accordance with Barro (1974). Furthermore, the endogenous
leverage used in our setting is default-free as it minimizes the agency cost of
II. The practitioner literature defines "value stock" as one that trades below its intrinsic
value. in contrast to "growth stock" which trades above its intrinsic value (see
Shearlock, 2006 and Kelleher. 2006). This perspective is consistent with the notion of
Tobin's Q (see Tobin 1969). Thus. value stocks have comparatively higher collateral
base. cash flows and dividend yield as opposed to growth stocks.
12. It should be noted that firms restrain on raisingextemal equity also avoids sending the
wrong signal on potential profitability to the market (see Myers and Majluf, 1984).
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debt (see Myers 2001). This yields two different Capital Market Lines
(CMLs) as illustrated in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 given below. Figure 2.2
illustrates that taxable investors dominate firm with the flatter slope (CML')
in the modified CAPM as indicated by their relatively low risk aversion level
and net borrowing status. We classify these types of firms with a flatter slope
as a "value" firm as their risk adjusted return for below market securities is
higher than that for opposite (see Figure 2.4). In contrast, Figure 2.3
illustrates the reverse of the above, where non-taxable investors dominate the
firm with the steeper slope in the modified CAPM (CML") as indicated by
their low risk aversion level and net borrowing status. We classify these
firms with a steeper slope as a "growth" firm as their risk adjusting returns for
above market risk is higher than that for the opposite (see Figure 2.4). Figure
2.3 also sheds light on the puzzling issue why bonds are observed in the
portfolio of taxable investors as it is construed as "inefficient" by Agnew et
al. (2003), Barber and Odean (2004) and Bergstresser and Poterba (2004).
These studies have focused on the issue of efficient asset location by studying
it in the context of Figure 2.2 only.
E(r)
rt
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rr'
Figure 2.2: Model I illustrates the Taxable Investor ("Net Borrower") as
a Dominant (i.e. Controlling) Agent of a Pure "Value" R.E. Entity
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Figure 2.3: Model II illustrates the Non-taxable Investor ("Net
Borrower") as a Dominant (i.e. Controlling) Agent of a Pure "Growth"
R.E. Entity
Pure Value R.E.
Entity
Figure 2.4: Contrasting the Frontiers of Value versus Growth
Consolidating a value firm (Figure 2.2) with a growth firm (Figure
2.3) yields Figure 2.4 which contrasts both frontiers. If we aggregate the
firms across the economy we may observe an overall flat line demonstrating
the net lending position of the non-taxable investors. This verifies the
observation of Black et al. (1972) and Miller and Scholes (1972) illustrating
that stocks with below market risk (or low beta) yield higher risk adjusted
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return than that predicated by the theoretical CAPM.13 This is also
corroborated by Brennan (1970) who finds that taxes diminish the return of
stocks with above market risk (or high beta)."
The above result proves that the shape of frontiers depends on the
identity of the net lenderlborrower. If the net lender in the aggregate
economy is the non-taxable one then a flatter frontier will be observed for
overall economy. Likewise, if the net lender is the taxable one then steeper
frontier is observed for the aggregate economy. In other words the shape of
the frontier is not determined by covariance risk of asset with market (i.e.
beta)."
Moving from a static environment to a dynamic one, we can easily
explain that as investor profile changes over time the aggregate frontier
rotates demonstrating a value growth premium as illustrated by Malkiel
(2003).16 This also confirms the empirical observation of Bell and Jenkins
(2002) and that of Collin and Kemsley (2000) illustrating that the dominant
(or marginal) investors in the U.S and U.K are taxable and non-taxable agents
13. Later studies by Reinganum (1981), Lakonishok and Shapiro (J986) and Fama and
French (1992) also find that the relation between beta and average returns is flat.
14. This is in line with Capaul et al. (1993) who state that value firms have low beta than
growth firms.
15. Our findings are consistent with Daniel and Titman (J997) which demonstrate that the
characteristics of stocks have more explanatory power to explain stock returns rather
than the covariance structure of returns (beta).
16. A similar argument can be made for dynamically changing wealth across competing
agents (see Ebrahim and Mathur, 2000). This is because wealth impacts on the
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution making high risk averse investors behave
like a low risk one. This argument is consistent with the findings of Pratt, 1964; Arrow,
1971; and Friend and Blume, 1975, which states that the absolute and relative risk
aversion level decreases with wealth.
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respectively." This rotation of aggregate frontiers changes the volatility of
stocks and bonds thereby shedding light on the puzzle cited earlier by LeRoy
and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981).
We organize our paper as follows: Section 2.2 illustrates the
theoretical underpinning of the "value" finn (while insinuating the same for
the "growth" finn). Section 2.3 evaluates the model solutions for the value
versus growth finn (relegating all proofs to the Appendix). Finally, Section
2.4 concludes the study.
2.2 MODEL DEVELOPMENT18
For the sake of simplicity and mathematical tractability, we assume a
two-period economy where there are two types of agents, two types of assets
and an exogenous entity called the government. The agents comprise of a
taxable and a fiduciary of a non-taxable institution (such as pension fund etc).
Agents are endowed with distinct amounts of the numeraire good, in our
economy, at times t = 0 and t = 1. They optimize their respective welfare at
time t = O. 19, 20 The assets in our economy consist of a real asset and a
17. The imposition of a low tax on pension funds assets reduces the relative impact of taxes
of the taxable agent in our economy. This allows them to be more competitive with the
non-taxable investors in bidding for shares of value stocks. This relative reduction in
taxes can enhance leverage due to consumption smoothing effects. This result is in
contrast to the tax hypothesis. Our results are corroborated by Fama and French
(1998a). In case of growth stocks, where the controlling investor is the non-taxable one,
increase in its tax rate reduces its demand for growth stocks. The relative decrease in tax
rates of taxable investors increases his/ her demand for growth stocks and reduces the
supply of debt. In case of growth stock there is a reduction of leverage. This is in tune
with the tax hypothesis"
18. The model in the current study adapts the analysis of Ebrahim and Mathur (2008) to a
framework of partial equilibrium.
19. Our model maximizes the expected utility of wealth instead of consumption. This
approach may seem to different from the norm of optimization over consumption.
However, both methods are similar as consumption evolves from wealth of assets,
whose payoffs are denominated in the numeraire good. Optimization of expected utility
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financial asset. The real asset consists of a project, whose payoffs at time t =
1 constitute of net operating income, NOI (i), and terminal value er), where
both i and PI are non-negative random first-order Markov processes and
their probability distributions are known to the agents in the economy as a
consequence of rational expectations. Investment in the real assets is
organized through an entity called a firm. The financial asset comprises of a
default-free bond issued by the firm by encumbering its underlying real assets
and trading off financial claims against its payoffs." The government
imposes a (i) corporate income tax at the rate of te on the operating income of
the firm, (iia) an individual tax at the rate of tp on the dividend paid by the
firm, and (iib) an effective capital gains of gtp on the appreciation of the
firm's stock price.22 In general, any profits made at the firm level are passed
through to the shareholders. Any losses of the firm have to be written off at
the corporate level.
of wealth is preferred over consumption because of legal constraints imposed on the
fiduciary such as the "Prudent Man Rule" under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 in the USA.
20. A two-period model is used instead of an overlapping generation's model as it avoids
the implicit assumption of the infinite tenure of a default-free bond. This approach is
consistent with that of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (I965a, b) and Mossin (1966) two-period
overlapping analysis.
21. We use default-free debt as it is pareto-superior to defaulting debt (see Ebrahim and
Mathur, 2007). This is consistent with Myers (2001) who states that "conflict between
debt and equity investors only arise when there is a risk of default. If debt is totally free
of default risk, debt holders have no interest in the income, value on risk of the firm.
But if there is a chance of defaults, then shareholders gain at the expense of debt
investors".
22. As the effective tax rate on capital gains is less than that on income/dividends, capital
gains are preferentially taxed. Thus, g is equivalent to the ratio of the effective capital
gains tax rate and the tax on income, i.e. g = ~ ::;;1. .
r
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The analysis in this section is carried out by modelling the taxable
investor [non-taxable] as a net borrower [lender] investing in only the firm
[the firm and the bond]. This is classified as Model I (representing the
"value" firm-illustrated in Figure 2.5. Here, the taxable agent has a
controlling interest in the firm. The scenario is reversed in Model II
(Pt - Q) Q
Equity Debt
nt
Q 4 nS(Pt - Q) i
Firm MODELl
"n" '-s(Pt -
Taxable
~ Fiduciary of a
(Non-Taxable)
)-+ Pension PlanInvestors +- s(P t - Q)+ .-ns(P t - Q
Q
Q (Pt - Q)
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Debt Equity
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Figure 2.5: Two modes of capitalizing a firm
Source: Ebrahim and Mathur (2008)
(representing the "growth" firm-illustrated in Figure 2.5) as discussed in the
following section with the taxable investor [non-taxable] as the net lender
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[borrower] investing in only the firm and the bond [the firm]. Here, the non-
taxable has a controlling interest in the firm. We then determine both model
solutions after imposing the necessary market clearing conditions. The
rationale for separating the analysis in two models is to avoid the impact of
the breakdown of the Tobin Fund Separation Theorem and incorporate the
competitive behaviour between the heterogeneous agents in the shaping of
optimal stakeholder claims. This also encapsulates the distinct impact of
taxes when the non-taxable investor is the net lender (in Model I), as opposed
to the scenario where she is the net borrower (in Model II). This is consistent
from a microeconomic point of view, where for every net borrower there is a
net lender.
2.2.1 Modelling the Taxable Investor as Net Borrower (Agent) in
a Value Firm
The objective of the taxable investor (in Model I) is to purchase s
fractional shares, of the equity of the firm and to borrow an amount Q
through the firm to maximize his expected utility of wealth:
subject to the temporal budget constraints
Wo = eo - s [Po - Q] Corporate Shell
23. All borrowing is undertaken by the firm at the level, which is termed the corporate shell
for explanatory purposes.
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WI = e + s [(q~+ P) - Q (1 + r)]I I I Corporate Shell (APT)
+P (l-g't ) + g'tP - Q)]I P 0 Corporate Shell
where: Eo {.} is the expectation operator at time 0,
DO is a strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable (Von
Neumann-Morgenstern) utility function of the taxable investor,
Wo is the wealth at time 0,
WI is the stochastic wealth at time 1,
Yis the discount factor,
s is the fractional investment in the shares of the firm,
Q is the total amount of capital resources borrowed at the firm level,25
24. The net payoffs ofa firm consist of the following components:
(i) The inflow component stems from s of the firm multiplied by the dividend income
added to its terminal value after deducting all the relevant taxes. First, the
dividend income (after-tax) is determined by deducting the taxes on income as (q,
(I-Te) (l-'tp). Second, the terminal value of the firm (after taxes) is determined by
deducting the capital gains tax of gT[P, - Po] from the stochastic future value of
- -
the proj ect (P ,) as [P, (l-gTp) +gTP0].
(ii) The outflow component stems from the payoff of the loan equal to [s Q(l+r)].
25. In the current model, Q is assumed to be positive as it denotes the amount borrowed
(see Model I, Figure 2.5). The following Section IIIa.(iva) discusses the case when Q'
is the amount lent (see Model II, Figure 2.5).
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Po is the price of the underlying project of firm at time 0 (Po = Debt
(Q) + Equity (Po-Q)),
eo and el are the respective endowments at times 0 and 1,
r is the real default-free interest rate,
q; is the NO! of the firm received at time 1,
PI is the terminal value of the underlying asset of the firm at time 1,
Teis the corporate tax rate,
Tpis the personal tax rate on dividends
gTpis the tax rate on capital appreciation of the stock investment, and
The suffix "APT" denotes the residual payoffs after all personal taxes.
The budget constraint at t = 0 (Equation 1) illustrates residual wealth
emanating from the initial endowment eo after deducting the cost of s fraction
of the leveraged firm at a unit price of (Po-Q). The budget constraint at t = 1
(Equation 2) illustrates net wealth emanating from the future endowment el in
addition to the payoffs of the fractional unit s of the firm's shares (after
repayment of debt and taxes).
The Lagrangian L can be written as
+AIY[el +s[(q; - Qr (I-Te)(I-Tp)+PI(I-gT)+gTP 0- Q]- WI]}
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The First Order Necessary Conditions (FONCs) can be stated as follows:
(i) At the maximum, the taxable investor will bid for the fractional shares
(s) of the firm, which generate net benefits equal to zero. Similarly, the
investor will avoid investing in a firm if the net benefit is negative.
This simplifies to the demand function for a firm described as follows.
The price bid for a share of firm (Po-Q) is equal to the expected value
of the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of the taxable investor
U'(W1)(lMRST = yEo[U'(w0)]) times the net proceeds of underlying project
(after repayment of bond and appropriate taxes).
(3)
(ii) At the maximum, the benefit of borrowing a unit amount of numeraire
good is equal to its associated cost. This simplifies to the demand
function for a bond described as follows. The IMRST of investor times
the grossed up factor (consisting of one plus the real rate of interest) is
equal to the unit amount of the numeraire good:
(4)
The above analysis segregates the investment decision from the
financing one as demonstrated in Equations (3) and (4), respectively.
Nonetheless, the two decisions impact each other through the optimal wealth
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parameters Wo and WI illustrating the violation of the well-known Fisher
Separation Theorem.26
Thus, a unique and constrained optimization of the taxable investor's
objective that the following conditions are fulfilled: First, the deterministic
budget constraint (at t = 0) as given by Equation (1), and the stochastic
budget constraint (for each state of the economy at t = 1), as given by
Equation (2), are satisfied; Second, the simplified FONCs, i.e., Equations (3)
and! or (4), are satisfied. We note that the second order conditions are
automatically satisfied as Chiang (1984) illustrates that maximization of a
strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable utility function with
quasi-convex constraints yields a negative definite bordered Hessian matrix.
2.2.2 Modelling the Fiduciary of an Institution as Net Lender
(Principal) in a Value Firm
Similar to the previous case, the objective of the fiduciary of a non-
taxable institution in Model I is to optimally select the fractional s' shares of
equity of the firm to purchase along with the amount of capital resources to
lend Q' to the firm to maximize her expected utility of'wealth."
26. The Fisher separation theorem states that under perfect and complete capital markets the
production decision of a firm is determined purely by objective market criteria (such as
maximization of wealth) without any consideration of subjective preferences. Market
imperfections, such as taxes invalidate the separation (see Fisher, 1930; and Hirshleifer,
1958).
27. Maximization of the expected utility of wealth by an non-taxable (i.e. pension fiduciary
is in accordance with ERISA particularly with respect to the Prudent Man's Rule.
Furthermore, the beneficiaries of a pension plan may endorse a more conservative
strategy with respect to their pension plan as opposed to their individual one. This is
consistent with empirical literature on 40l(K) plans versus an individual brokerage
account (see Agnew et al., 2003; and Barber and Odean, 2004).
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(. , , 'Q')In wo' W l' S,
subject to the temporal budget constraints
w' - e' s'[P Q'] Q' (5)o 0 0 Corporate Shell
w\ = e'l + s'[(i + p) - Q'(l +r)] Corporate Shell [ACT] + Q'(l +r) (6)
where: V(·) represents the strictly concave and twice continuously
differentiable (Von Neumann-Morgenstern) utility function of the fiduciary
and notations with primes have the same meaning as that in the case of the
taxable investor.
The budget constraint at time t = 0 (Equation 5) illustrates the residual
wealth emanating from the initial endowment e'o after deducting the cost of
the portfolio comprising of a fraction s' of the firm at a unit price of (Po-Q')
and a bond of Q' made to the underlying firm. The budget constraint at t = 1
(Equation 6) illustrates net wealth emanating from future endowment e'l
along with the payoffs of the same portfolio of the firm's stock and bond.
The Lagrangian L' can be written as
+~ -Q']+Q'( 1+r)-W'I]}
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The FONes can be stated as follows:
(i) At the maximum, the fiduciary will bid for a fraction s' of the firm
shares, which generates net benefits equal to zero. Similarly, the
fiduciary will avoid investing in the firm if the net benefit negative. This
too, simplifies to the demand function of the firm yielding an optimal
price (Po-Q') as equal to the expected value of the intertemporal
V'(W' )
marginal rate of substitution of the fiduciary (IMRSF = y'Eo[ V'(w'~)])
times the net proceeds of property after repayment of bond.
(7)
(ii) At the maximum, the benefit of lending is equal to its associated cost.
This simplifies to the supply function for a bond described as follows.
The IMRSF times the grossed up factor (consisting of one plus the real
rate of interest) is equal to the unit amount of the numeraire good:
(8)
Here too, the above analysis segregates the investment decision from
the financing one as shown in Equations (7) and (8), respectively.
Nonetheless, the two decisions impact on each other through the optimal
wealth parameters Wo and WI'
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Thus, a unique constrained maximum of the non-taxable fiduciary's
objective requires that the following conditions are fulfilled: First, the
deterministic budget constraint (at t = 0) as given by Equation (5), and the
stochastic budget constraint (for each state of the economy at t = 1), as given
by Equation (6), are satisfied; Second, the simplified FONCs, i.e., Equations
(7) and! or (8), are satisfied. The second order conditions for a maximum are
automatically satisfied due to the properties of a strictly concave and twice
continuously differentiable utility function with quasi-convex constraints (see
Chiang, 1984).
2.2.3 The Market Clearing Conditions
(i) For the asset (stock) market to be in equilibrium:
The fractional shares bought must sum up to one, i.e., s + s'= 1. Also,
the fiduciary may not be allowed to short firm's shares, i.e., s' 2: o.
Furthermore, in the long run; taxable investor may not permanently go
short in the asset market, i.e., s 2: o. (9)
(ii) For the debt (bond) market to be in equilibrium:
Funds Borrowed (Q) = Funds Lent (Q') (10)
2.3 MODEL SOLUTION
A Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) is defined as one where all
agents in the economy are knowledgeable of the firms payoffs (qj, PI) and
their probability distributions. Assuming competitive markets and no initial
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capital constraints a distinct solution, i.e., equilibria is feasible for risk-averse
investors on satisfaction of the necessary conditions (discussed below). The
optimal capital structure of a firm is contingent on the quality of the
underlying project owned by it and involves the efficient financing package
that minimizes the endogenous agency costs of debt under market
imperfections such as taxes. The agents in the economy, thus, opt for
efficient choices that involve the different clientele of the firm. If the taxable
investor outbids his non-taxable counterpart and owns the firm in its entirety,
as demonstrated by s = land s' = 0 in Model I in Figure 2.5, it is classified as
the first-corner solution. If both entities own fractions of the firm, as
demonstrated by s> 0 and s'> 0 in Models I and II (Figure 2.5), it is termed as
an interior solution. Finally, if the fiduciary outbids her taxable counterpart
and owns the firm in its entirety, as demonstrated by s = 0 and s'=l in Model
II (Figure 2.5), it is termed as the second-corner solution. Our results are thus
different from the solutions discussed in the literature stemming from linear
models.
2.3.1 The Necessary Conditions for Model Solutions
2.3.1.1 Lemma
A rational expectations equilibrium for a default-free bond involves at
most two distinct solutions, depending on the identity of the net borrower.
The first [second] equilibrium requires satisfaction of the necessary
conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) [(i), (iv) and (v)] as described below:
(i) Basic Condition: The future stochastic payoffs of the underlying project
owned by the firm, composed of the sum of NO! plus the terminal
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value, are strictly positive even in the worst state of the economy. That
is, Min. (qlj + PI) > > 0 '\j j. (11)
The above condition necessitates that the underlying real asset of the
firm be of high quality to retain its value in the subsequent period.
(iia) Asset (Stock) Pricing Condition for the Interior Solution (when the
taxable investor is the net borrower as illustrated in Model I in Figure 5)
requires that the agents do not outbid each other for the ownership of
the firm. In other words, the expected value of the IMRS of each
investor times the net proceeds of the real estate project after repayment
of the default-free bond and appropriate taxes is equal to the price of the
firm:
(iib) Asset (Stock) Pricing Condition for the First Comer Solution (when the
taxable investor is the net borrower) outbidding of the non-taxable
investor:
(12b)
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(iii) Debt (Bond) Pricing Condition for the Interior/ First Comer Solution
(when the taxable investor is the net borrower) requires equality
between the demand and supply functions for default-free bond
financing:
= 1, \1's8(0, 1] (13)
(iva) Asset (Stock) Pricing Condition for the Interior Solution (when the
fiduciary is the net borrower as illustrated in Model II in Figure 5)
requires satisfaction of the condition similar to Equation (12a).
However, the wealth parameters for the case where the fiduciary is the
net borrower are respectively evaluated, (differently from those in
Sections Il.a and Il.b), as follows:
Wo = eO - s [Po - Q]corporate Shell- Q (la)
WI = el + s [(i +p) - Q(1 +r)]Corporate Shell (APT) + Q(1 +r) APT
+grl' O)-Q) ]corporate Shell+Q( 1+r( I-tp)) (2a)
w' - e' s' [P Q]o - 0 - 0 - CorporateShell (5a)
Wi - e' + s' [(q- +1') Q(l+r)]I I I I CorporateShell (6a)
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(ivb) Asset (Stock) Pricing Condition for Second Comer Solution (when the
fiduciary is the net borrower) outbidding of the taxable investor:
Here too, the wealth parameters are given by Equations (5a) and (6a).
(v) Debt (Bond) Pricing Condition for Interior/ Second Comer Solution
(when the fiduciary is the net borrower) requires equality between the
supply and the demand functions for default free bond financing (after
substituting for the wealth parameters as given in Equations (la), (2a),
(5a) and (6a)):
(15)
2.3.2 Key Results
2.3.2.1 Proposition
In an economy with competing taxable and non-taxable agents, asset
pricing is contingent on the classification of firm (value versus growth) and
the risk profile of investors. In general, our results illustrate that "value"
firms are dominated by taxable investors while "growth" firms are dominated
by non-taxable investors.
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Aggregating the two firms (i.e. value and growth) in the economy
does reduce unsystematic risk. However, it yields a flat risk-return profile
when the value effect dominates the growth and vice versa (sees Figure 4).
This is contingent on the identity of net lender. If the net lender in that
aggregate economy is the non-taxable agent then a flatter risk-return frontier
will be observed for the entire economy. In contrast, if the net lender is the
taxable agent then a steeper risk-return frontier will be observed for the
economy. Our results also demonstrate that a single ex-ante efficient market
portfolio (comprising of aggregate "value" and "growth" firms) can be
observed on a flatter or steeper frontier in a static environment. This result
would be invalidated in a dynamic environment with changes in investor
profile which rotates the frontier. This rationale is different from that
advanced by Roll (1977) which stem from non-marketable assets (like human
capital etc.). The dynamic movement of the frontier rationalizes the volatility
of stocks and bonds illustrated in LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981).
Finally our results rationalize the puzzle why bonds are observed in
the portfolio of taxable agents in spite of the fact that it is deemed as
inefficient by Agnew et al. (2003), Barber and Odean (2004) and Bergstresser
and Poterba (2004).
2.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The asset pricing model is a fundamental issue in financial economies.
We study this issue in a rational expectations economy by incorporating the
rivalry between taxable and non-taxable investors. Our approach segregates
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investors into two groups with different portfolio frontiers as non-taxable
agent prefers to maximize pre-tax returns, while taxable prefers to maximize
their after tax returns. This constitutes a setting where the Tobin Two Fund
Separation Theorem is invalidated. This approach allows us to rationalize the
value versus growth phenomenon in an aggregate and a dynamic economic
environment.
We derive the following results. First, we demonstrate that the
difference in firm's characteristics (in terms of value versus growth) and the
risk profile of the agents, (incorporating the endogenous use of leverage)
leads to one type of agent dominating over the other for the control of the
firm. This, in turn, yields two different Capital Market Lines (CMLs) with
contrasting frontiers. That is, flatter slope ("value" firm) due to the
domination of taxable investors and steeper slope ("growth" firm) due to the
domination of taxable investors. The latter also shed light on the puzzling
issue raised by Agnew et al. (2003), Barber and Odean (2004) and
Bergstresser and Poterba (2004) on why taxable investors own bonds in their
portfolio.
Second, extending the above analysis in the aggregate economic
environment, we observe an overall flat line demonstrating the net lending
position of the non-taxable investors verifying the empirical observation of
Brennan (1970), Black et al. (1972), Miller and Scholes (1972), Reinganum
(1981), Lakonishok and Shapiro (1986), Fama and French (1992), Collin and
Kemsley (2000) and Bell and Jenkins (2002). This proves that the shape of
the frontiers depends on the identity of the net lender. Extending the analysis
from a static environment to a dynamic one where investors profile changes
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over time the aggregate frontier rotates demonstrating a value versus growth
as illustrated in Malkiel (2003). The continuous rotation of this aggregate
frontiers can possibly explains the volatility of stocks and bonds thereby
shedding light on the puzzle raised in LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller
(1981).
Our results also produce implications for the applications of asset
pricing particularly in the context of investment appraisal, portfolio
management (in term of excess return over the expected return predicted by
the asset pricing model; i.e. represented by Jensen's Alpha) and shareholder
value analysis (SVA). In the case of former, asset pricing estimates the
hurdle rate for any given projects, thus any underestimation [overestimation]
cause the acceptance [rejection] of projects being considered (see Nicholas,
1993). As for the latter two, we conjecture a relationship between SVA and
Jensen's Alpha. Since our result shows that beta line is dynamic and
contingent to the identity of net lender in the aggregate economy, we argue
that investment appraisal; Jensen's Alpha and SVA should also be dynamic
over time. Nevertheless, we reserve these issues for future research.
Appendix I: Proofs
1.1 Proof of Lemma
(i) This condition is attributed to the fact that real assets, yielding the
terminal payoffs of a firm, serve as collateral for the bond. Since
these real assets retain some value in the following period, it enables
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the net borrower to repay the default-free bond with interest in all
states of the economy.
(iia) Equation (12a) is derived using Equations (3), (7), (9) and (10).
(iib) Equation (l2b) is derived using Equation (3), (9) and (l0).
(iii) Equation (13) is derived using Equations (4), (8), (9) and (10).
(iva) An Equation similar to Equation (12a) is evaluated reversing the
Principal-Agent relationship in Section II. It is derived by
maximizing the two-period expected utility of wealth of both taxable
and non-taxable investors using the budget constraints described by
Equation (2a), (5a) and (6c).
(ivb) Here too, equation (I4) is derived by reversing the Principal-Agent
relationship in Section II. It is the counterpart of Equation (12a) with
fiduciary as net borrower.
(v) Equation (I5) is the counterpart of Equation (4) and (8) for a Growth
Firm (where net borrower is non-taxable investor). It is also derived
by optimizing the two-period expected utility of wealth of both
taxable and non-taxable agents using budget constraints described by
Equations (la), (2a), (5a) and (6a)
Q.E.D
1.11 Proof of Proposition
(i) The equilibrium for both value and growth firms are as a result of
wealth smoothing, where the individual agent and non-taxable
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fiduciary adjust this intertemporal marginal rate of substitution to own
a fraction of a firm (where s ~ 0, s' ~ 0) and to trade default-free bond
claims against firm's cash flow (see Stocks and Bond pricing
conditions for both firms in Lemma).
(ii) For a "value" firm the dominant investor is the taxable one. In
contrast, for a "growth" firm the dominant investor is the non-taxable
one. Thus, the shape of the frontier is dependent on the identity of the
net lender. Aggregating the two firms in the economy yields a flat
risk-return profile when the value effect dominates the growth one and
vice versa. This is again contingent on the identity of the net lender.
(iii) Non-marketable assets make it difficult to observe ex-ante the market
portfolio reaffirming Roll (1977). However, in our case the rotation
of the frontier makes it difficult to observe the market portfolio even if
all the assets in our economy were all marketable assets.
(iv) The puzzle why bonds are observable in the portfolio of taxable
agents is illustrated in Equation (15) and Figure 2.3.
Q.E.D
43
CHAPTER THREE
3. RATIONALIZING THE VALUE
PREMIUM UNDER ECONOMIC
FUNDAMENTALS: EVIDENCE
FROM EMERGING ECONOMIES
3.1 INTRODUCTION
"Growth stocks, which derive market values more from growth
options, must therefore be riskier than value stocks, which derive
market values more from assets in place. Yet, historically, growth
stocks earn lower average returns than value stocks."
(Lu Zhang, 2005, pp 67)
The findings of Fama and French (1992) that single factor
encapsulating risk (i.e., beta) does not adequately explain cross sectional
differences in stock return have unfolded a new dimension to the research in
asset pricing literature. The paper has not only reignited the debate on the
fundamental relationship between risk and return but also challenges the
status-quo of the widely accepted Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
Since then, voluminous articles both in theoretical and empirical research
have been written to provide a new insight to explain the cross sectional
differences in stock return. Often, the aim of these articles is to explicate the
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pattern in average stock returns that are not explained by the Capital Asset
Pricing Model, which are commonly known as anomalies.
This essay examines the issue of the value premium puzzle which is
one of the most pronounced anomalies. That is, portfolios formed on the basis
of high book-to-market (BEIME), cash flow-to-price (C/P) and earnings-to-
price (E/P) have been found to earn significantly higher risk-adjusted return
compared to portfolios with contrasting characteristics. The objective of this
paper is not merely to ascertain the presence of value premium in a new
market as the evidence for it seems to be compelling, but rather to provide a
new explanation for rationalizing it.28 This issue is of utmost importance as
there is no consensus or reconciliation of the explanations rationalizing the
source of it (see Chou et aI., 2010).29
This essay alms to justify the value premium from economic
fundamentals and to reconcile the diverging perspectives. We demonstrate
that this premium occurs due to the tendency of 'glamour firms' to hoard cash
and delay implementing growth strategies, particularly in times of economic
uncertainty (see Titman, 1985; McDonald and Siegel, 1986; and Ingersoll and
Ross, 1992). Since glamour stocks derive their market value from embedded
28. Fama and French (I998b) document the presence of value premium in twelve of the
thirteen major markets they studied. Moreover, studies such as Rosenberg et al.
(1985); Brown et al. (1983), Chan et al. (1991) also find value premium in United
States, Australia and Japan respectively.
29. Finance literature suggests four possible explanations for the sources of value
premium. First, the advocates of neoclassical finance like Fama and French (1995)
attribute the source to an additional risk factor. Second, behavioral finance
researchers like Lakonishok et al. (1994) asserts that the cognitive biases of investors
in undervaluing the distress stocks and overvaluing the growth stocks leads to the
premium in value stocks. In contrast, Daniel and Titman (1997) claim that value
premium is due to a firm's characteristics and finally some contest the presence of
value premium and accredit it to methodological issues.
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growth (i.e. real) options (see Zhang, 2005), we believe that their hoarding
behavior limits their exposure to risk and yet has a significant detrimental
impact on the return of their stock. This rationalizes the value anomaly.
The theoretical basis of our study stems from Fama and French (FF -
1995) and Daniel and Titman (DT - 1997). FF developed a three-factor
model wherein the coefficient capturing distress risk termed as HML, is lower
for glamour firms in contrast to value firms. Demonstrating that glamour
firms generate lower returns (due to their lower distress risk), they conclude
that this risk is the main factor in accounting for the wide discrepancy
between value and growth firms. This is challenged in Dichev (1998) and
Griffin and Lemmon (2002), who claim that distress risk does not contribute
to value premiums. We take this point further, and argue that both the cash-
drag factor and firms' unique characteristics (illustrated in DT) need to be
taken into consideration.
In contrast to value firms, glamour firms have a wider array of
strategic options, which convey much more flexibility. Whilst these options
contain varying levels of risk through incurring the capital outlay, the firms
also have the choice of limiting their exposure to risk by not investing
resources in new strategies, especially in poor economic environments.
Glamour firms thus hoard cash through tough economic conditions, thus
yielding lower returns. In contrast, value firms, which are prominent in
mature and/or declining markets, are more limited in their options. Such
firms face financial risk in addition to business risk. This is because value
firms have assets in place, which are used as collateral to lever up to boost
earnmgs. They thus have less flexibility in managing their risk, due to the
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costly reversibility of their assets (Zhang, 2005). Thus, our approach in
rationalizing the value premium is consistent with the neoclassical
framework, where an asset with lower risk yields a lower return, and vice
versa.
Since most studies on the value premium have been conducted on
developed countries, it reinforces the critique of Black (1993), Campbell
(2000) and MacKinlay (1995) that the value premium is a developed
economy phenomenon. This study therefore prefers to study this anomaly
from the perspective of emerging economies, i.e., Brazil, Russia, India and
China (denoted by the acronym BRIC).30 However, due to accessibility
issues of Russian statistics in DataStream, we substitute it with Turkey,
another large emerging economy. We believe Turkey is a good substitute for
Russia as its represents an European emerging economy. In addition, the
creator of the BRIC acronym, Jim O'Neill, is planning to include Turkey and
three other emerging economies in a new grouping (Hughes, 2011). Thus,
this essay studies the value premium from the BTIC countries instead of
BRIC.
We believe that our sample is appropriate to test our hypothesis for
several good reasons. Firstly, BTIC countries are not developed markets but
rather a group of emerging economies, with periods of remarkable growth
from the early 2000S.31 Therefore, they contain plenty of firms which are
30. We also study Malaysia, an emerging economy with a top heavy, closely held, and
state-owned institutional setting to check the robustness of our analysis.
31. The rapid growth of emerging economies and its impact on world economy have been
discussed extensively in popular press. For instance, the August 6th, 2011 issue of the
Economist magazine highlights several remarkable and noteworthy statistics on
emerging versus developed economies. Emerging economies account nearly fifty four
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endowed with growth options. Furthermore, as emerging economies these
countries are exposed to high economic uncertainties. It should also be noted
that these countries are emerging as important global powers, making a
significant impact on the world economy. According to the World
Development Indicators, BTIC share of global economy as of 2010 is almost
fifteen per cent, with average GDP growth ranging from three per cent to ten
per cent in the last two decades. Furthermore, these countries present vast
economic potential for investors for several reasons. Firstly, the median age
of the population in these countries ranges from twenty-five to thirty-five
years old, implying a large pool of human resource. Secondly, the population
of these countries forms forty per cent of the world population, signifying
impending new markets. Finally, the market capitalization of these four
countries is approximately eight trillion dollars, representing sixteen per cent
of the world market capitalization.
Our research draws on two recent papers that contrast the approaches
ofFF with DT. Chou et al. (2010) investigates both models in the context of
the Japanese market, and their findings are consistent with Davis et al.
(2000), where the choice of models depends on the duration of the sample. In
a similar vein to DT, another study by Chen et al. (2010) proposes a new
three-factor model to incorporate characteristics that are able to explain many
patterns in cross-sectional returns, in contrast to the limited model proposed
percent of world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) measured at purchasing power parity
and three-quarters of global real GDP growth over the last ten years. Similar trend
can be seen in trade figures where exports exceeded half of the world total with import
increased to forty seven percent. There also a significant jumped in foreign direct
investment (FDI), commodity consumption and capital spending. Last but not least,
the market capitalization increased to thirty five percent, tripled than it was in year
2000.
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by FF. We aim to extend these findings, by conducting research that is not
sample specific (a limitation of Chou et al., 2010), and by employing the
rationale of real options where the investment perspective (based on Net
Present Value in Chen et al., 2010) fails to hold.32 This essay also reconciles
the diverging views: (i) within the neoclassical asset pricing literature (as
espoused by FF and DT); and also (ii) the neoclassical and behavioral
perspectives in this area.
We specifically address two issues: (i) is there a value premium in
BTIC markets? (ii) does our economic intuition rationalize the presence of
value premium and reconcile the apparently conflicting views in the
literature? The sample period covered in this study is from 1999 to 2009 and
the relevant variables are obtained from DataStream. We initially
demonstrate the existence of a significant value in the context of the BTIC
market. Nonetheless, based on the widely-used Altman Z score model, our
analysis shows that value firms are no more prone to risk than glamour firms,
though there is more leverage employed by value firms.
32. Ingersoll and Ross explain this as follows:
" If in making the investment today we lose the opportunity to take on the same
project in the future. then the project competes with itself delayed in time. In
deciding to take an investment by looking at only its NPV.
Standard textbook solution tacitly assumes that doing so will in no way affect
other investment opportunities. Since a project generally competes with itself
when delayed. the textbook assumption is generally false. Notice. too. that the
usual intuition concerning the "time value of money" can be quite misleading
in such situations. While it is true NPV postponing the project delays the receipt
of its positive NPV. it is not true that we are better off taking the project now
rather than delaying it since delaying postpones the investment commitment as
well ."
"Of course. with a flat. non-stochastic yield curve we would indeed be better off
taking the project now. and this sort of paradox could not occur. But that brings
up the even more interesting phenomenon that is central focus of this article.
the effect of interest-rate uncertainty on the timing of investment ...
(Ingersoll and Ross, 1992, pp. 2)
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Our research provides evidence suggesting that the source of the value
premium is in the investment patterns of glamour firms. Through observation
we can show that the coefficients (HML) of growth portfolios are generally
lower during the low growth periods, but these increase considerably during
the periods of expansion. This shows that glamour firms delay the adoption
of new strategies in periods of high economic uncertainty, in order to limit
their risk. Finally, our regression analysis reveals that the coefficients (HML)
of glamour portfolios are sensitive to changes in firms' total assets. These
results suggest that the increase in total assets - which in the context of our
study is the proxy for undertaking growth options - explains the changes in
business risk of glamour firms. This affirms our hypothesis that the
investment patterns of glamour firms has a significant impact on their risk
and return.
Our results also resolve the various perspectives in the literature as
follows. Firstly, reconciling the findings of FF and DT: The observation of
firms' unique characteristics made by DT can be attributed to the growth
options available to glamour firms; a consequence of lowering their returns
due to the hoarding of cash and delaying the undertaking of these options.
Yet this is what FF perceives as evidence of distress risk. We contend that FF
and DT observe the same result but identifying the phenomenon in different
ways. Secondly, we view the ability of glamour firms' flexibility to manage
their embedded growth options not only to its operational and strategic
advantage yielding capital gains and dividends, but also in providing utility in
itself. This endowed options provides 'glamour firms' with an allure with
which to entice investors. This 'fascination' of glamour firms is identified by
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Sargent (1987) as constituting a premium in price (and hence a discount in
returns) that helps aligns the neoclassical and behavioral perspectives. Lastly,
the over-reaction hypothesis of DeBondt and Thaler (1985 and 1987) is
rationalized through the volatile nature of value firms' leveraged equity,
which is akin to Call options. These options are depressed in poor economic
states but rebound in prices with improving economic climate.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 of the paper reviews
the relevant literature, before illustrating our research questions and
methodology used. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 then presents the data and the results
of our analysis. Section 3.5 finally provides the concluding comments.
3.2 LITERA TURE REVIEW
Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965a and 1965b) and Mossin (1966)
developed the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which demonstrates that
the risk of an asset (in terms of its beta) can sufficiently account for the cross-
section of expected stock returns. Since its development, a number of
empirical studies have tested the model, on the assumption that beta is the
sole explanatory variable with a positive and linear relation to asset return, yet
the results have been inconclusive. Earlier empirical studies (such as Black et
aI., 1972; Blume and Friend, 1973 and Fama and McBeth, 1973) provided
reasonable support for the CAPM. Later studies, however, have become
more critical of it due to the repeated evidence of anomalies and the
questionable validity of its assumptions (see Roll, 1977; Basu, 1977, 1983;
Stattman, 1980; Banz, 1981; DeBondt and Thaler, 1985; Rosenberg et aI.,
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1985; Bhandari, 1988; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Cohen et al., 2002; and
Titman et al., 2004).
FF (1992) concludes that using CAPM with a single beta does not
adequately explain cross-sectional differences in stock returns. Their own
study showed that as there is limited, if any, relationship between beta and the
stock return. The CAPM is thus found to be insufficiently pricing risk. As a
result of the evident limitations of the CAPM, they developed the three-factor
model consisting of: (i) an overall market factor (RM.Rf); (ii) a size premium
(SMB) (i.e., the return on a portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a
portfolio of large stock); and (iii) a value premium (HML) (i.e., the return on
a portfolio of value stocks - high BE/ME - minus the return on a portfolio of
glamour stocks - low BE/ME), to explain the cross-section of returns on US
stocks. The intuition of FF is based on the belief that risk is multidimensional
if stocks are to be priced rationally. The logic behind this is traced to
Merton's (1973) intertemporal CAPM and to Ross's (1976) arbitrage pricing
theory (APT). FF (1993 and 1996) thus confirm that 5MB and HML are
related to risk factors in stock returns. This is due to the existence of
covariance between them. Furthermore, these risk factors contribute
significantly to the variation in stock returns.
The development of this model attracted a great deal of academic
interest, much of it centered on the source of the value premium. In line with
the hypothesis of rational pricing, both FF (1993) and Chen and Zhang (1998)
argued the value firms are riskier, as they are more likely to be subject to
financial distress than glamour firms. FF (1995) consequently demonstrated
that value [glamour] stocks are generally associated with firms that have
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persistently low [strong] earnings. In light of this evidence, they suggest that
value [glamour] firms have positive [negative] loading on HML, implying
higher [lower] distress. This was countered by Zhang (2005), who claims
that value firms are riskier as they have greater assets at risk than glamour
firms, This is particularly evident in poor economic environments, where
firms with fixed assets are at greater risk for investors than those with growth
options. This is because the fixed assets of value firms burden them with
unproductive capital as these firms face a higher cost of discarding them.
A number of alternative theories have emerged seeking to explain the
value premium. Focusing on investor sentiment and trading strategies, two
empirical studies (Lakonishok et aI., 1994; and Haugen, 1995) demonstrate
that value ('unspectacular') firms produced superior returns. This is due to
investors' extrapolations from the firms' performances, where investors
projected past strong [weak] performance of glamour [value] firms too far
into the future. Investors thenirrationally overbuy [oversell] glamour [value]
finns'stocks. However, when the market realizes that the actual performance
for glamour [value] firms is lower (higher) than initially expected, the
glamour [value] finn's stocks end up with low [high] returns.r' This finding
is similar to the observations of De Bondt and Thaler (1985 and 1987), who
argue that poorly performing stocks (,losers') over the past three to five years
outperform previous 'winners' during the subsequent three to five years.
In contrast to FF (1995), DT (1997) claim that it is a finn's
characteristics, as opposed to covariance risk, that offers an explanation for
33. La Porta et al. (1997) find that value firms have systematically positive earnings
surprise while glamour firms display the opposite.
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the value premium. The presence of high covariance between value stocks is
not due to a distress factor, but rather to their common characteristics, such as
being categorized in a similar line of business or comparable industries. To
substantiate their claim, they showed that the presence of high covariance
between stocks has no significant relation with the distress factor. That is, a
high covariance exists even before the value firms become distressed.34
Other potential explanations for the value premium are proposed on
methodological grounds. Banz and Breen (1986) and Kothari et al. (1995)
suggest that the selected samples used in studies are more likely to include
firms that have survived a period of distress than firms that have failed - this
is commonly known as the survivor bias theory. However, such claims are
later refuted by a number of studies, such as Davis (1994), Chan et al. (1995)
and Cohen and Polk (1995). Yet another explanation advanced is that the
value premium is due to data 'snooping', where continued testing using the
same data set naturally shows patters in average returns (see Lo and
MacKinlay, 1988; Black, 1993; MacKin lay, 1995 and Conrad et al., 2003).
In order to test this data-snooping hypothesis Barber and Lyon (1997)
propose the testing of samples from different time periods or countries.
Thus, the literature review reveals that little has been published on the
rationale behind the value premium especially with respect to the emerging
markets. Whilst previous studies have documented the presence of value
premiums (see Geert, 1999; Drew and Veeraraghavan, 2002 and 2003), the
only paper to investigate the source of it is Yen et al. (2004) that attributes its
34. In a similar note, Lee et al. (2007) find that stock characteristics provided a better
explanation for United Kingdom value premiums.
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presence to the one-way overreaction of value firms in Singapore. As this is
the only research identified in the context of emerging markets, it is clear that
many questions surrounding the controversy of the value premium remain
unanswered.
3.3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
In order to conduct our study, we collect our sample of listed firms of
BTIC, and extract the relevant data in the period 1999 to 2009 from
DataStream. The firms included in the sample fulfill the standard criteria
employed in the literature, i.e. they all have DataStream stock prices for
December of the year t-I and June of year t, and DataStream book value for
year t-1. In addition, each firm has at least two years' data on DataStream.35
In addressing our first research question, we employ the standard
methodology as proposed by FF (1993). We initially form six portfolios
(S/L, SIM and S/H; B/L, BIM and B/H) by intersecting two groups that are
arranged by BEIME (BE as net tangible assets, i.e., equity capital plus
reserves minus intangibles). We use the median size for each year as the
threshold point for size. Stocks with ME higher than the median are assigned
as 'big' (B); conversely, stocks with a lower ME are designated 'small' (S).
With regards BE/ME, we split the stocks into three groups based on the
breakpoints for the bottom 30% ('low'), middle 40% ('medium') and top
35. This criterion is required to address the issue of survival bias documented by Banz and
Breen (1986) and Kothari, et al., (1995).
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30% ('high') of the ranked values of BE/ME.36 We consequently compute
the value-weight monthly returns of the six portfolios from July of year t to
June of year t+1, when we reform the portfolios. We then repeat the same
process, though using the twenty-five portfolios with intersecting BE/ME.
This is to check the robustness of the results and to deal with any in-sample
portfolio issues inherent in the smaller BEIME portfolios. However, there are
two differences. The twenty five size-BEIME portfolios are constructed
using equally weighted and quintile breakpoints for ME and BE/ME.
To address our second research question, we divide our analysis into
two phases. In the first phase, we use measures of bankruptcy risk, as
proposed by Altman (1993), to investigate whether firms with a high
likelihood of distress are also firms with high B/M (value). This is undertaken
to examine the relationship between the Z-score and the BE/ME ratio.
Information from a negative relationship related to a price distress factor
would be captured by both the BE/ME and the Z-score. However, if the
relationship is positive then we can conclude that the Z-score and the BE/ME
contain different information and that both variables are potentially related to
differences in relative risk across firms (see Griffin and Lemmon, 2002). 37 In
the context of this paper, we argue that the relative risk is attributed to each
firm's characteristics.
36. We do not use negative Book Equity (BE) firms when forming the size-BEIME
portfolios, as they do not have an economic explanation.
37. We employ the following model developed by Altman (1993) to evaluate the Z-score:
Z = 1.2Xl + 1.4 X2 + 3.3X3 + O.6~ + l.OXs
X, = Working Capital/Total Assets
X2 = Retained Earnings / Total Assets
X3 = Earnings Before Taxes + Interest / Total Assets
X, = Market value of equity / Total Liabilities
x., Net Sales / Total Assets
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We form portfolios based on three independent rankings on BE/ME,
five rankings on the Z-score and two rankings on ME (size).38 This report
only contains size-adjusted data, which are the simple average of the means
of the small and large groups of firms. Firms that are located in the lowest
quintile of Z-scores have the highest probability of bankruptcy, with the
probability decreasing the higher we move up the quintiles.
In the second phase, our focus is on the coefficient of HML, as our
objective is to demonstrate that its value is determined by the risk of firms'
characteristics rather than the distress risk. In order to fulfill this objective,
we undertake a two-staged approach. In the first stage, we employ the FF
(1995) three factor model to determine the coefficient of HML. 39 Our
preliminary analysis reveals that this model is adequate to capture the
portfolio return for the BTIC markets. Table 3.1a and 3.1b show that none of
the alphas are significant.
In contrast to FF (1995), we argue that HML is the proxy for the
firm's characteristics and the changes in loading reflect the constant changes
in business and financial risks. Therefore, in order to capture this dynamic
attribute, we use rolling beta regression to estimate the time varying
coefficient ofHML (conditioning beta) rather than conventional static
38. The break points for BE/ME and size are similar to the formation of the smaller group
of six BEIME portfolios.
39. The FF (1995) three factor model is given by: Rpt-Rft = a + b (Rmt-Rft) +s 5MB + h
HML +E. We use Ordinary Least Square (Newey-West HAC estimator) regression
technique to estimate this model.
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Table 3.1a
Fama and French Three Factor (FFTFM) for Weighted Monthly Excess
Returns on Six Portfolios formed on Size and BE/ME: BTIC, 7/1999-
6/2009, 120 Months.
(Six size-BE/ME portfolios-Overall); Rpt-Rft ~ a + b (Rmt-Rft) +s 5MB + h HML +1:
Portfolio BG BM BY SG SM SY
BRAZIL
A 1.89 0.52 1.69 1.16 1.35 1.89
tea) 3.46 1.05 3.34 1.45 1.70 3.19
B 0.22 0.86 0.04 0.13 0.21 0.24
t(b) 1.52 11.12 0.67 1.52 1.65 1.50
S -0.28 -0.68 -0.70 0.86 0.62 0.12
t(s) -2.26 -6.21 -6.34 4.90 2.47 0.73
H -0.10 0.54 0.56 -0.73 -0.26 0.82
t(h) -1.16 5.50 5.53 -4.56 -1.39 8.48
TURKEY
A 0.52 -2.18 -0.04 -0.06 -1.18 -0.31
tea) 3.22 -4.91 -0.05 -0.06 -3.09 -0.55
B 1.26 0.09 0.35 1.06 0.54 0.63
t(b) 45.02 4.07 3.33 3.13 7.89 5.07
S -0.30 0.98 0.58 1.88 1.10 1.25
t(s) -14.40 22.98 4.27 4.62 10.90 9.80
H -0.32 0.92 0.63 -0.07 0.38 0.39
t(h) -10.09 29.34 4.73 -0.29 5.60 3.51
INDIA
A -0.30 0.63 0.92 1.64 0.05 -0.08
tea) -1.93 3.27 1.20 2.40 0.12 -0.67
B 0.86 1.12 1.01 1.34 0.83 0.98
t(b) 43.59 40.48 11.38 16.57 15.35 52.39
S -0.04 -0.07 0.10 2.79 0.44 0.74
t(s) -1.86 -2.96 1.07 20.52 3.64 20.14
H -0.02 0.01 0.13 -1.94 0.21 0.48
t(b) -1.43 0.84 1.91 -17.26 2.12 16.72
CHINA
A -0.17 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 0.12 -0.19
t(a) -1.26 -0.17 -0.04 -0.04 0.80 -2.06
B 0.96 1.03 1.01 0.98 0.96 0.98
t(b) 42.94 41.84 26.58 40.89 21.43 33.09
S 0.02 -0.22 -0.09 0.87 0.78 0.96
t(s) 0.47 -4.87 -1.50 19.65 14.45 28.34
H -0.48 -0.21 0.57 -0.39 0.00 0.43
t(b) -8.18 -3.06 6.50 -6.44 0.02 6.97
Notes; B/G, big to growth; BIM, big to medium; BN, big to value; S/G, small to growth;
SIM, small to medium, S/G, small to growth. Bold (t) statistics indicates that the
estimated coefficient is significant at 5%.
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Table 3.tb
FFTFM for Simple Monthly Excess Returns on Twenty-five Portfolios
formed on Size and BEIME: BTIC, 7/1999-6/2009, t20 Months
(Rpt-Rft = a + b (Rmt-Rft) +s 5MB + h HML +t)
BRAZIL
Size Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High
a t{a~
Small 3.18 0.26 7.54 3.03 4.45 1.69 0.23 1.86 2.47 3.72
2 0.31 2.75 1.95 3.11 2.86 0.34 2.28 1.98 3.35 3.17
3 0.86 2.54 2.92 1.65 3.14 0.86 2.05 2.43 2.65 1.89
4 2.57 1.74 2.10 2.60 4.56 2.80 1.82 2.11 2.79 2.90
Big 1.56 1.91 3.16 2.66 2.54 2.54 2.29 3.74 3.55 0.71
b t~b~
Small 0.05 0.06 0.49 0.15 0.12 0.28 0.53 0.78 1.30 1.09
2 0.17 0.17 0.32 0.18 0.21 1.27 0.89 1.40 1.33 1.48
3 0.29 0.10 0.17 0.20 0.05 2.72 0.76 0.96 1.75 0.28
4 0.15 0.35 0.24 0.21 -0.09 1.10 2.71 1.38 1.52 -0.97
Big 0.19 0.13 0.18 0.19 1.49 1.53 0.87 0.84 1.13 1.28
s t{s~
Small 1.01 0.29 -0.56 0.14 0.52 1.82 l.l5 -0.67 0.45 2.08
2 0.43 0.70 0.09 0.42 -0.39 1.13 1.57 0.32 1.06 -1.78
3 0.12 -0.02 0.48 0.21 -0.19 0.44 -0.09 1.04 0.99 -0.58
4 0.03 0.26 -0.23 -0.34 -0.77 0.10 2.08 -1.12 -1.66 -3.48
Big -0.12 -0.53 -0.73 -0.75 2.64 -0.71 -2.33 -3.13 -3.57 2.44
h t(h)
Small -0.49 -0.30 0.29 -0.04 0.13 -0.88 -1.32 0.39 -0.16 0.42
2 -0.46 0.24 0.15 0.01 0.71 -1.23 0.65 0.98 0.04 3.30
3 0.08 0.01 -0.21 0.01 0.97 0.34 0.05 -0.54 0.07 2.73
4 -0.15 -0.14 0.18 0.26 0.82 -0.51 -1.45 1.06 1.66 3.49
Big -0.05 0.23 0.34 0.43 -1.85 -0.57 1.12 1.86 2.88 -0.97
Notes: S refers to size and L to BEIME. For instance SILl refers to lowest quintile in size
and BEIME. Bold (t) statistics indicates that the estimated coefficient is significant
at 5%.
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TURKEY
Size Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High
a t~a~
Small -1.68 0.65 -0.75 -0.11 0.04 -1.30 0.48 -0.95 -0.22 0.06
2 0.23 -0.91 -0.65 -0.50 -0.35 0.09 -1.11 -0.83 -0.65 -0.50
3 1.40 -0.64 -1.12 -0.94 0.37 0.52 -0.64 -3.10 -1.16 0.73
4 -1.61 -1.24 -1.84 0.26 -0.19 -1.99 -2.59 -3.08 0.52 -0.27
Big -0.72 -1.54 -2.08 -1.26 1.38 -1.22 -2.52 -3.61 -1.63 1.42
b t~b~
Small 0.46 0.74 0.34 0.54 0.55 2.66 4.81 4.27 5.87 5.64
2 1.49 0.61 0.58 0.65 0.36 1.92 5.44 5.53 4.05 4.22
3 0.94 0.57 0.45 0.47 0.75 2.72 2.21 5.71 2.99 4.60
4 0.46 0.34 0.23 0.34 0.45 5.35 8.31 1.94 6.10 4.23
Big 0.61 0.36 0.08 0.41 0.44 3.53 2.53 0.84 3.96 2.30
s t s
Small 1.45 0.89 1.04 1.16 1.13 7.94 4.97 9.58 10.66 9.49
2 2.54 1.17 0.93 1.29 1.34 2.44 8.86 8.58 9.16 12.02
3 1.45 0.78 1.14 1.15 1.37 4.61 2.41 13.79 7.85 8.07
4 0.99 0.94 1.12 0.97 0.92 7.23 10.33 13.59 17.84 8.05
Big 0.37 0.94 0.89 0.92 0.29 2.02 7.04 9.59 8.41 1.51
h t{h}
Small 0.51 0.04 0.54 0.37 0.44 3.04 0.32 6.46 4.87 6.63
2 0.04 0.42 0.41 0.36 0.66 0.08 3.48 4.03 2.76 7.77
3 -0.11 0.30 0.55 0.41 0.51 -0.25 0.90 8.77 2.71 4.20
4 0.53 0.63 0.77 0.64 0.55 6.14 8.08 7.56 11.32 5.37
Big 0.25 0.72 0.98 0.70 0.57 1.37 5.33 9.57 7.03 3.25
Notes: S refers to size and L to BE/ME. For instance SILl refers to lowest quintile in size
and BE/ME. Bold (t) statistics indicates that the estimated coefficient is significant
at 5%.
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Cont.
INDIA
Size Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High
a t{a~
Small 2.14 2.65 2.33 3.06 3.28 1.17 1.73 1.95 2.01 2.83
2 2.46 2.29 2.46 2.66 3.78 1.00 1.74 0.68 1.89 2.90
3 3.84 1.62 2.18 2.25 3.55 1.51 1.72 1.63 2.09 2.37
4 1.78 2.13 1.95 3.53 1.37 1.27 1.51 l.71 2.52 1.05
Big 0.98 1.85 1.76 1.95 4.30 1.41 1.48 1.27 1.27 2.70
b t{b~
Small 0.26 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.33 1.28 2.42 2.14 2.09 2.05
2 0.55 0.41 0.55 0.47 0.44 2.69 2.38 1.36 3.40 2.27
3 0.13 0.56 0.41 0.35 0.42 0.33 3.70 2.99 2.94 2.65
4 0.28 0.40 0.35 0.39 0.33 1.93 2.22 2.01 2.34 2.41
Big 0.46 0.43 0.52 0.47 0.51 2.90 2.57 2.70 2.81 3.00
s t{s~
Small -0.01 0.06 0.12 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 0.54 1.09 -0.40 -0.13
2 0.24 -0.02 0.24 -0.05 -0.08 1.06 -0.28 0.62 -0.57 -0.94
3 0.05 -0.00 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.61 -0.06 0.44 0.07 0.79
4 -0.02 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.08 -0.23 0.53 0.73 0.54 0.55
Big 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.06 1.33 0.59 0.64 0.09 0.39
h t{h}
Small 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.76 1.45 1.71 1.32
2 0.22 0.01 0.22 0.03 -0.04 1.58 0.13 0.82 0.47 -0.72
3 0.04 0.79 0.05 0.05 0.11 1.03 1.63 0.87 0.84 1.99
4 0.08 0.03 0.12 0.11 0.08 1.42 0.63 2.93 1.66 0.79
Big 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.02 1.48 1.81 1.39 0.76 0.17
Notes: S refers to size and L to BEIME. For instance SiLl refers to lowest quintile in size
and BE/ME. Bold (t) statistics indicates that the estimated coefficient is significant
at 5%.
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CHINA
Size Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High
a t~a~
Small 0.56 0.91 1.55 1.95 1.06 2.78 4.27 2.20 3.12 2.02
2 -0.02 1.18 1.34 1.70 1.38 -0.09 2.38 2.54 2.67 2.42
3 0.17 0.14 0.31 0.96 0.30 0.40 0.38 1.03 1.83 1.24
4 -0.22 0.35 0.23 0.42 0.20 -0.98 1.45 0.62 2.07 0.80
Big -0.10 0.22 0.15 0.24 0.24 -0.32 1.05 0.72 1.38 1.77
b t~b~
Small 0.85 0.90 0.67 0.62 1.14 16.67 15.87 4.58 6.08 17.71
2 1.02 0.89 0.73 0.58 0.75 16.38 7.83 5.74 3.79 5.76
3 0.74 0.81 0.97 0.80 0.96 4.90 7.64 11.80 6.02 15.19
4 0.99 0.97 0.79 1.04 1.02 18.83 11.85 6.94 24.57 34.15
Big 0.72 0.93 0.92 0.96 1.04 4.85 19.12 43.76 41.82 31.11
s t~s~
Small 0.93 0.88 0.32 -0.17 0.99 16.40 13.64 1.62 -0.87 8.15
2 0.86 0.47 0.21 0.16 0.21 8.44 2.30 1.00 0.84 0.93
3 0.79 0.84 0.71 0.28 0.78 9.43 8.55 7.94 1.28 9.92
4 0.66 0.26 0.65 0.68 0.64 9.07 3.49 6.42 9.05 9.99
Big 0.20 0.17 0.1 I 0.12 0.06 1.74 2.38 2.31 2.40 I.13
H t(h)
Small -0.32 -0.30 -0.25 -1.15 0.28 -4.10 -2.56 -0.72 -2.91 1.39
2 -0.29 -0.70 -0.55 -0.79 -0.42 -2.63 -3.58 -2.47 -1.71 -1.40
3 -0.1 I 0.21 -0.00 -0.46 0.32 -0.38 0.92 -0.04 -1.66 2.54
4 -0.34 -0.30 0.14 0.07 0.41 -2.70 -2.11 0.68 0.48 3.21
Big -0.26 -0.36 -0.03 0.20 0.48 -0.90 -3.62 -0.52 2.98 6.18
Notes: S refers to size and L to BE/ME. For instance SiLl refers to lowest quintile in size
and BEIME. Bold (t) statistics indicates that the estimated coefficient is significant
at 5%.
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analysis. We regress the value and glamour portfolios' excess returns using
the three factor model with a 36-month rolling window.l''
In the second stage of our analysis, we regress the time varying
coefficient of HML Y', for the i'h portfolio on the conditioning variable
known at time t. We use the mean as the central tendency measure to convert
the value of coefficients from monthly to annual. Our model is given as
below:
Y'n = ao + I ~j Xjil + 11i + 11t + Sit (1)
Where: i represents portfolios ranging froml to N, while t denotes the time
ranging from I to T. X captures (J) portfolio-specific characteristics (proxy
variables) which vary with time and across firms (in a panel data structure).
ao is the intercept, 11i and 11t represents portfolio specific fixed effects and time
specific effects respectively. Finally, Sit is the error term assumed to be
independently and identically normally distributed with zero mean and
constant variance, Sit;:::; i.i.d. N (0, (J2). The conditioning variables are the
current and the lags of natural logarithms of total asset and total debt. The
natural log of total asset measures the sensitivity of undertaking growth
option, while the natural log of total debt measures the sensitivity of
undertaking leverage. We also add interaction variables to differentiate the
coefficient for value and glamour firms, and gross domestic product (GDP) to
reflect the economic condition at time t.
We estimate Equation I usmg the static panel data estimation
technique. This is to address the need for a larger number of data points, as
40. We use twenty-five intersecting portfolios rather than six to have a larger sample size.
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the number of portfolios in our sample is very small. There are a number of
advantages in using static panel data estimation. First, it increases the degree
of freedom and reduces the collinearity problem (see Hsiao, 2003). Second,
panel data have the ability to control for the problem of endogeneity without
the need for external instrument. The choice between random and fixed is
determined by conducting the Hausman test.
3.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 3.2a shows the average excess return on the six size-BE/ME
equity sorted for the full sample. The results show that the value portfolios
produced higher returns than the glamour portfolios in all BTIC countries
except for India where small growth (SG) dominates the small value (SV)
portfolios. We suggest that this might be due to the fast growing information
technology industry in India. Looking at the micro picture, value portfolios
have performed exceptionally well especially in Turkey where the average
value portfolios return of big and small portfolios is approximately 1.4%, the
highest among all BTIC countries. In contrast, the Chinese market has the
lowest return for value portfolios, but still marginally higher than the glamour
portfolios. There is no significant value premium in India.
Table 3.2b reconfirms similar patterns in returns. The portfolios in
the highest in BE/ME quintile generate the highest return compared to other
portfolios. These findings are consistent with many studies that report high
book-to-market stocks to have higher returns than big and low book-to-
market equity stocks.
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Table 3.2a
Summary Statistics for Weighted Monthly Percent Excess Returns on
Six Portfolios formed on Size and BEIME: BTIC, 7/1999-6/2009,120
Months
Portfolio RPTRFT Portfolio RPTRFT
BRAZIL
BG 2.13*** SG 1.38**
(3.53) (1.67)
BM 2.21 *** SM 2.10***
(2.65) (3.15)
BV 1.82*** SV 3.48***
(3.22) (4.37)
VMG 0.895
(1.56 )*
TURKEY
BG -0.84 SG 1.19
(-0.70) (0.61 )
BM 0.62 SM 0.47
(0.51) (0.40)
BV 1.70* SV 1.48
( 1.30) (1.13)
VMG 1.415
( 1.38)*
INDIA
BG 0.81 SG 8.01 **
( 1.19) (2.07)
BM 2.10** SM 2.67***
(2.32) (2.78)
BV 2.81 *** SV 3.91 ***
(2.59) (3.22)
VMG -1.05
(-0.54)
CHINA
BG 0.12 SG 0.76
(0.23) (1.20)
BM 0.37 SM 1.09*
(0.61) (1.62)
BV 0.92* SV 1.13*
(1.35) (1.60)
VMG 0.585
(2.45)***
Notes: BIG, big to growth; BIM, big to medium; BN, big to value; S/G, small to growth;
S/M, small to medium, S/G, small to growth; VMG [{(SV+BV)/2}-{(SG+BG)/2}],
value minus growth, RPTRFT, return of a certain portfolio minus risk free rate. We
report one mean t-statistics with Ho=O and HI >0 in parentheses. The symbols *
indicate significance at 10%, ** at 5% while *** at 1%.
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Table 3.2b
Summary Statistics for Simple Monthly Percent Excess Returns on
Twenty-five Portfolios formed on Size and BEIME: BTIC, 7/1999-6/2009,
120 Months
PT RPTRFT PT RPTRFT PT RPTRFT PT RPTRFT PT RPTRFT
BRAZIL
SILl 3.59 S2Ll 0.62 S3LI 1.69 S4LI 2.81 S5Ll 1.90
(1.74) (0.70) (I.73) (2.93) (3.01)
SIL2 0.26 S2L2 4.02 S3L2 2.78 S4L2 2.69 S5L2 2.07
(0.24) (2.67) (3.10) (3.50) (2.60)
SIL3 8.97 S2L3 3.02 S3L3 3.52 S4L3 2.72 S5L3 3.39
(2.41 ) (2.92) (3.58) (3.34) (3.78)
SIL4 3.48 S2L4 3.93 S3L4 2.34 S4L4 3.15 S5L4 3.00
(3.29) (4.39) (3.15) (4.08) (3.39)
SIL5 5.30 S2L5 3.85 S3L5 4.16 S4L5 4.35 S5L5 0.46
(4.93) (3.67) (2.61 ) (2.35) (0.11 )
TURKEY
SILl 0.58 S2Ll 2.18 S3LI 2.21 S4Ll 0.26 S5Ll -0.60
(0.33) (0.63) (1.01) (0.20) (-0.06)
SIL2 1.31 S2L2 0.84 S3L2 0.53 S4L2 0.84 S5L2 0.71
(0.84) (0.59) (0.40) (0.69) (0.53)
SIL3 1.22 S2L3 0.74 S3L3 0.94 S4L3 0.73 S5L3 0.75
(0.96) (0.52) (0.74) (0.56) (0.55)
SIL4 1.56 S2L4 1.24 S3L4 0.84 S4L4 2.39 S5L4 0.89
( 1.27) (0.90) (0.65) (1.83) (0.59)
SIL5 1.82 S2L5 2.15 S3L5 2.47 S4L5 0.76 S5L5 3.54
(1.39) ( 1.60) (1.51 ) (0.57) (2.33)
INDIA
SILl 2.51 S2Ll 4.18 S3Ll 4.21 S4LI 2.26 S5LI 1.94
(1.46) ( 1.22) (1.94) (1.76) ( 1.84)
SIL2 3.31 S2L2 2.84 S3L2 2.53 S4L2 2.84 S5L2 2.71
(2.12) (2.00) (1.95) (2.35) (2.05)
SIL3 3.22 S2L3 2.82 S3L3 2.94 S4L3 2.73 S5L3 2.75
(2.58) ( 1.99) (2.32) (2.13) (2.04)
SIL4 3.56 S2L4 3.24 S3L4 2.84 S4L4 4.39 S5L4 2.83
(2.92) (2.40) (2.21 ) (3.39) (1.88)
SIL5 3.82 S2L5 4.15 S3L5 4.47 S4L5 2.16 S5L5 5.38
(3.00) (3.12) (2.75) ( 1.68) (3.50)
CHINA
SILl 1.31 S2LI 0.83 S3Ll 0.93 S4Ll 0.49 S5Ll 0.27
(2.18) ( l.l7) (1.37) (0.75) (0.46)
SIL2 1.69 S2L2 1.51 S3L2 l.l7 S4L2 0.87 S5L2 0.65
(2.57) (2.05) (1. 70) ( 1.42) (l.lI)
SIL3 2.00 S2L3 1.54 S3L3 1.23 S4L3 l.l1 S5L3 0.74
(2.47) (2.25) (1.71) (1.71) (1.28)
SIL4 1.53 S2L4 1.63 S3L4 1.29 S4L4 1.43 S5L4 1.01
(1.96) (2.15) (1.88) (2.05) (1.61 )
SIL5 2.40 S2L5 1.67 S3L5 1.46 S4L5 1.39 S5L5 1.20
(2.67) (2.31 ) (2.05) (1.94) ( 1.70)
Notes: S refers to size and L to BEIME. For instance SIll refers to lowest quintile in size
and BEIME. RPTRFT, return of a certain portfolio minus risk free rate. We report
one mean t-statistics with Ho=O and HI >0 in parentheses.
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Table 3.3 present summary statistics of the characteristics of the
stocks in each group. Looking at all the five quintiles of Z-score, there seems
to be no apparent difference between low BE/ME and high BEIME stocks in
all four BTIC countries, with the exception of the first quintile of Z-score for
India with the Z-score -0.262 for low BE/ME stocks and 0.803 for high
BE/ME stocks. Nevertheless, both types of stocks in all four countries
exhibit similar scores as we move to the higher quintiles. These findings
suggest that the presence of value premium is not due to distress risk, which
contradicts the observation of Fama and French (1995). In term of cross
countries comparison, Brazil seems to have the lowest Z-scores for all the
five quintiles, while Turkey has the highest, particularly in the fifth quintile.
Table 3.3 also shows the average book-to-market ratio for each quintile.
Similar to Z-score, there are no significant pattern for Turkey, China and
Brazil. However, for India the average book-to-market ratio is higher for
firms with a low Z-score in contrast to firms with a high Z-score within the
high BE/ME group.
This study also reports summary statistics of a firm's size, total asset,
market leverage, and profitability for the companies in each portfolio. This is
to further examine our hypothesis that Z-score and BE/ME are both related to
characteristics that are considered to reflect distress risk. In the case of
Turkey and Brazil, we find the low BEIME stocks have larger asset size and
market value of equity than high BE/ME stocks. In contrast, we observe the
opposite pattern for China and India. This finding is simply a reflection of the
different stage in economic growth for these countries.
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Table 3.3
Summary Statistics of Firm Characteristics for Portfolios (BTl C) Sorted
on BE/ME and the Probability of Financial Distress.
Portfolio L M H L M H
Z-score
BRAZIL TURKEY
1 0.560 0.572 0.418 0.735 0.811 0.772
2 1.414 1.389 1.608 2.105 2.160 2.051
3 2.060 2.303 2.019 3.517 3.486 3.524
4 3.590 3.157 3.040 8.939 8.810 7.979
5 7.201 8.710 8.162 69.948 62.708 69.621
INDIA CHINA
1 -0.262 0.940 0.803 1.147 1.454 1.352
2 1.811 1.898 1.738 2.757 2.645 2.575
3 2.910 2.911 2.490 4.277 4.145 3.891
4 5.320 4.312 5.190 7.185 6.760 6.689
5 20.919 18.018 17.388 15.893 16.027 16.800
ROA
BRAZIL TURKEY
1 -0.561 2.582 4.204 2.129 2.518 1.161
2 8.242 7.777 10.039 10.329 11.724 8.022
3 11.840 11.093 9.718 10.876 8.793 10.851
4 12.801 11.389 12.408 11.407 11.779 11.443
5 12.895 12.508 16.960 11.201 11.186 10.703
INDIA CHINA
1 1.279 1.113 4.326 -3.133 1.824 2.796
2 3.016 7.057 8.916 1.942 3.603 4.181
3 8.164 9.622 10.18 3.184 4.505 4.971
4 11.293 13.055 16.138 4.574 5.539 5.836
5 10.369 13.715 5.989 5.783 5.913 5.427
Notes: Firms from July 1999 to June 2009 are ranked independently every June based on
their values of the probability of financial distress (Z-Score) calculated using
Altman (1993) model and book-to-market ratio. Return on Assets (ROA) is the ratio
of income before extraordinary items to total book assets.
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ConL
Portfolio L M H L M H
BEIME
BRAZIL TURKEY
1 0.563 2.236 13.40 0.424 1.071 2.676
2 0.425 2.074 10.04 0.439 1.079 2.265
3 0.528 2.023 8.526 0.509 1.059 1.986
4 0.467 2.060 9.570 0.429 1.046 2.401
5 0.542 1.917 9.191 0.431 1.021 2.110
INDIA CHINA
1 0.233 0.915 12.935 0.169 0.391 2.029
2 0.241 0.826 5.477 0.186 0.386 0.890
3 0.282 0.769 9.165 0.189 0.379 0.784
4 0.242 0.807 2.640 0.185 0.376 0.730
5 0.211 0.788 1.800 0.194 0.382 0.664
Leverage
BRAZIL TURKEY
1 2.373 5.260 13.883 38.514 47.914 17.290
2 1.687 3.526 12.184 2.407 3.945 1.839
3 2.347 2.235 4.987 1.595 1.887 3.097
4 0.664 1.401 2.871 0.192 0.195 0.542
5 0.294 0.311 0.686 0.019 0.0228 0.017
INDIA CHINA
1 1.851 3.648 22.492 0.683 0.897 2.261
2 0.773 1.412 3.951 0.375 0.458 0.736
3 0.566 0.671 11.65 0.249 0.299 0.366
4 0.210 0.513 0.482 0.142 0.171 0.187
5 0.084 0.111 0.054 0.604 0.060 0.067
Notes: Firms from July 1999 to June 2009 are ranked independently every June based on
their values of the probability of financial distress (Z-Score) calculated using
Altman (1993) model and book-to-market ratio. BEIME is book value of equity
over market equity. Leverage is the ratio of total book assets less book equity to
market equity.
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Cont.
Portfolio L M H L M H
Size
BRAZIL TURKEY
1 1159.02 785.12 126.07 442.50 115.54 46.72
2 1514.87 1628.89 571.98 447.11 193.62 141.16
3 3492.90 1594.41 491.11 663.74 381.18 204.45
4 10800.00 5086.36 166.44 1920.48 273.36 116.19
5 2558.05 642.06 70.92 1574.83 698.13 571.26
INDIA CHINA
1 11000.00 15400.00 3463.13 2969.00 4115.76 3681.60
2 46800.00 9977.45 3201.04 3105.87 4171.18 5049.86
3 27100.00 30100.00 4201.77 3517.92 6638.30 6306.43
4 81600.00 95200.00 3380.94 4494.88 8668.66 5072.71
5 33000.00 8026.51 691.83 4147.04 12100.00 3314.04
Asset
BRAZIL TURKEY
1 3338.94 3994.79 1799.59 6824.44 3845.21 3231.65
2 3776.39 7321.18 3065.61 1134.73 1600.13 938.01
3 4273.59 4913.85 1827.24 1214.64 1201.48 871.05
4 14600.00 8869.94 974.94 1098.99 433.44 265.09
5 2211.93 798.57 245.32 389.07 323.06 242.79
INDIA CHINA
1 39200.00 49700.00 53200.00 3291.68 6412.77 8261.10
2 56100.00 27600.00 23400.00 2264.66 4076.56 7659.62
3 20200.00 32222.00 56500.00 2058.43 5076.09 8662.24
4 70700.00 55000.00 10200.00 1945.70 6623.17 5982.95
5 10300.00 8254.92 2415.83 1548.65 4344.95 3034.57
Notes: Firms from July 1999 to June 2009 are ranked independently every June based on
their values of the probability of financial distress (Z-Score) calculated using
Altman (1993) model and book-to-market ratio. Size is the market value of equity
while asset is the total asset. Both size and total assets are in million.
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Moreover, this also indicates that big firms in China and India have reached a
more mature stage, while big firms in Turkey and Brazil are still growing.
Furthermore, market leverage is negatively related to Z-score across our
samples. Nonetheless, we find that firms in high BE/ME quintile have higher
leverage in contrast to firms with low BE/ME which is consistent with our
earlier argument that value firms have more leverage than the growth firms.
Finally, profitability is positively related to Z-score, but we find no evidence
that low BE/ME firms are more profitable than high BEIME firms.
Tables 3.4a and 3.4b provides the rolling regression estimates of the
Fama-French three factor model for the full sample period. Table 3.4a
reports the mean regression parameter for the six BE/ME portfolios, while
Table 3.4b reports the mean regression of the twenty five BE/ME portfolios.
Since the focus of this study is on the coefficient of HML (h), we choose not
to discuss the estimated value of other parameters. In the case of the small
size BE/ME portfolios, we find the coefficients of HML (h) are either
negative or have a small positive value. For instance, the average coefficient
for glamour stocks in China is -0.414, Brazil is -0.6235, India is -0.6225,
and Turkey is 0.005.
In the case of the twenty five BE/ME portfolios, we observe
inconsistent patterns. Turkey and India have positive loadings for portfolios
in the lowest quintile of BEIME while China and Brazil have negative
loadings. Nonetheless, our findings are mostly consistent with FFs arguments
that glamour stocks should have negative loadings and vice versa for value
stocks. However, unlike Fama and French (1995), we argue glamour firms do
'not have negative loadings due to lower distress, as our earlier analysis
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reveals that the distress level is similar for both types of firms. In fact, we
argue that glamour portfolios have lower loading because the choice of
delaying growth options gives glamour firms the opportunity to reduce their
risk. In addition, the process of delaying the exercising of these options gives
glamour firms the ability to accumulate cash in their balance sheet. Thus, in
accordance with the maxims of finance, glamour portfolios earn low returns
purely due to the cash drag as cash earns very little return.
We suggest that investors display an 'infatuation' with glamour firms
based on the potential growth opportunities stemming from the embedded
growth options. Thus, their prices are driven higher through bidding in
contrast to the 'unspectacular' value firms. In Lucas' Rational Expectations
framework (1978), glamour firms constitute an 'alluring' asset, a point further
extended by Sargent (1987). This reconciles the neoclassical perspective with
the behavioral one.
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Table 3.4a
Mean coefficients of rolling regression for six size-BEIME portfolios
(BTIC)
BG BM BV SG SM SV
BRAZIL
Constant -0.544 0.869 1.l35 0.611 -0.544 1.408
Rm-Rf 0.194 0.697 0.201 0.158 0.194 0.582
5MB 0.309 -0.828 -0.900 1.l15 0.309 0.412
HML -0.297 0.599 0.782 -0.950 -0.297 0.666
TURKEY
Constant 1.l74 -2.233 0.126 -0.093 1.l74 -0.457
Rm-Rf 0.733 0.037 0.730 0.885 0.733 0.568
5MB 0.494 0.996 0.061 1.981 0.494 1.265
HML -0.085 0.977 0.283 0.090 -0.085 0.438
INDIA
Constant 1.820 0.487 1.124 1.294 1.820 -0.050
Rm-Rf 0.407 1.067 1.006 1.194 0.407 0.968
5MB -0.075 -0.245 0.006 2.052 -0.075 0.645
HML 0.171 0.200 0.373 -1.416 0.171 0.532
CHINA
Constant 0.706 0.043 -0.015 -0.048 0.706 -0.087
Rm-Rf 0.847 1.008 1.009 0.983 0.847 0.986
5MB 0.724 -0.199 -0.178 0.749 0.724 0.892
HML -0.406 -0.223 0.538 -0.422 -0.406 0.337
Notes: The coefficients are generated from rolling regression (36-month rolling window)
using FFTFM.
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Table 3.4b
Mean coefficients of rolling regression for twenty-five size-BEIME
portfolios (BTIC)
Ll L2 L3 L4 L5 Ll L2 L3 L4 L5
BRAZIL
Constant Market
SI 4.810 -0.544 4.752 3.298 3.740 0.097 0.194 0.296 0.212 0.312
S2 -0.179 3.387 1.571 3.135 2.802 0.211 0.321 0.361 0.124 0.570
S3 0.249 2.432 1.921 1.056 3.471 0.386 0.144 0.278 0.325 0.155
S4 2.220 1.129 1.890 2.007 2.078 0.001 0.256 0.225 0.313 -0.620
S5 1.257 1.066 2.194 1.715 4.023 0.372 0.317 0.526 0.503 1.534
5MB HML
SI 1.742 0.309 -2.341 0.382 0.841 -0.996 -0.297 1.157 -0.228 -0.046
S2 0.760 0.951 0.087 0.464 -0.257 -0.769 -0.080 0.087 -0.081 0.777
S3 -0.030 0.165 0.024 -0.063 -0.1 06 0.275 -0.145 0.207 0.288 0.809
S4 -0.242 0.219 -0.304 -0.320 -0.513 0.100 -0.121 0.166 0.284 0.462
S5 -0.158 -0.457 -0.700 -0.474 3.483 0.002 0.259 0.369 0.363 -2.465
TURKEY
Constant Market
SI -1.212 1.174 -0.760 -0.389 -0.059 0.025 0.733 0.390 0.453 0.352
S2 -2.760 -0.676 -0.783 -1.238 -0.209 0.494 0.644 0.226 0.471 0.262
S3 3.367 -1.641 -1.012 -1.506 0.126 1.320 0.239 0.460 0.576 0.671
S4 -2.311 -1.407 -2.324 -0.132 -0.533 0.174 0.320 0.144 0.390 0.631
S5 -0.822 -1.396 -2.300 -0.862 1.062 0.727 0.311 0.295 0.552 0.583
5MB HML
SI 1.347 0.494 1.108 1.096 1.110 0.771 -0.085 0.552 0.459 0.541
S2 1.935 0.920 0.959 1.107 1.321 0.655 0.397 0.696 0.514 0.692
S3 1.995 1.194 1.031 1.020 1.255 -0.326 0.774 0.518 0.392 0.547
S4 0.917 0.957 1.142 1.008 0.919 0.637 0.654 0.894 0.670 0.499
S5 0.311 0.708 0.803 0.396 -0.062 0.186 0.662 0.838 0.418 0.336
Notes: The coefficients are generated from rolling regression (36-month rolling window) using
FFTFM.
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Cont.
Ll L2 L3 L4 L5 Ll L2 L3 L4 L5
INDIA
Constant Market
SI 1.407 1.820 1.594 1.590 2.194 -0.005 0.407 0.182 0.206 0.179
S2 -0.411 1.258 1.038 0.988 2.835 0.263 0.282 0.332 0.336 0.220
S3 5.427 0.507 1.177 1.010 2.425 -0.322 0.362 0.327 0.267 0.238
S4 0.115 0.896 1.003 2.400 0.138 0.147 0.225 0.157 0.248 -0.050
S5 0.189 0.748 -0.023 0.681 3.002 0.291 0.275 0.476 0.424 0.578
5MB HML
SI -0.690 -0.075 -0.745 -0.601 -0.519 0.573 0.171 0.695 0.505 0.416
S2 -0.545 -0.669 -0.571 -0.644 -0.705 0.661 0.414 0.497 0.524 0.426
S3 -0.455 -0.689 -0.670 -0.697 -0.773 0.329 0.645 0.438 0.507 0.731
S4 -0.643 -0.600 -0.654 -0.711 -1.576 0.616 0.489 0.623 0.615 0.672
S5 -0.448 -0.588 -0.632 -0.525 -0.287 0.438 0.519 0.560 0.406 0.079
CHINA
Constant Market
SI 0.608 0.706 0.505 0.413 0.461 0.852 0.847 0.595 0.468 1.119
S2 -0.191 0.619 0.686 0.325 1.808 1.021 0.751 0.398 0.418 0.844
S3 0.252 0.467 0.053 -0.127 0.300 0.882 0.873 0.843 0.674 0.874
S4 0.158 0.486 0.671 0.456 0.353 1.063 0.997 0.865 1.021 1.032
S5 0.347 0.489 0.467 0.379 0.425 0.908 0.949 0.967 0.972 1.030
5MB HML
SI 0.842 0.724 -0.023 0.019 1.199 -0.409 -0.406 -0.177 -0.440 0.317
S2 0.791 0.623 0.314 0.473 0.391 -0.312 -0.352 -0.355 0.021 -0.232
S3 0.633 0.781 0.548 0.523 0.654 -0.131 0.108 0.002 0.037 0.328
S4 0.498 0.243 0.283 0.512 0.493 -0.662 -0.385 -0.057 0.133 0.280
S5 -0.230 -0.122 -0.064 0.002 -0.060 -0.562 -0.543 -0.101 0.096 0.364
Notes: The coefficients are generated from rolling regression (36-month rolling window)
using FFTFM
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The leverage undertaken by value firms causes a drag on their
performance in poor economic environments, particularly as leveraged equity
displays the volatility associated with financial options (see Merton, 1974).
The expansion of the economy causes a bounce-back effect on value stocks,
helping to reconcile the neoclassical perspective with the behavioral one
espoused by DeBondt and Thaler (1985 and 1987). In light of our intuition,
we graph the coefficient of HML of the larger twenty-five sized BE/ME
portfolios of every BTIC country to provide further insight to our argument.
Figures 3.1-3.100 illustrates the pattern of time varying betas (coefficient of
HML) for each portfolio. Based on these figures, we observe that value
portfolios not only have higher coefficients than glamour portfolios, but also
exhibit a stable pattern over time. In contrast, the coefficients (HML) of
glamour portfolios are generally lower and exhibit a more volatile pattern.
Moreover, their coefficients are generally dependent on the economic growth.
[Insert Figures 3.1-3.100 here]
The above hypothesis is further tested has by estimating Equation 1
using the static panel data estimation technique. The Hausman test claims that
the fixed effect panel is more suitable than random. Our hypothesis postulates
that value portfolios should be more sensitive to natural logarithm of
leverage, while glamour firms response to the natural logarithm of total asset.
The estimation results for equation are presented in Table 3.5. There are few
points that stand out from our analysis. First, we observed the lag of total
asset is positive and significantly related to growth portfolio, confirming the
sensitivity of growth portfolio to the changes in total assets. Second, we
.notice the interaction variable for total asset has a negative coefficient,
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Table 3.5
Estimation output for Equation 1 (BTl C)
Dependent Variables: HML
Independent Variables Coefficient
Total Assets 0.0442
Total Assets (-1) -0.0403
Total Assets (-2) 0.1651 *
Total Debt -0.0910
Total Debt (-1) 0.0613
Total Debt (-2) -0.0797
Total Assets*Dummy -0.2980**
Total Assets*Dummy (-1) -0.1534
Total Assets*Dummy (-2) -0.2982**
Total Debt*Dummy 0.2932***
Total Debt*Dummy (-1) 0.0748
Total Debt*Dummy (-2) 0.1572
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) -0.0034
Constant 1.0999
t
0.50
-0041
1.80
-1048
0.81
-l.l9
-2.06
-0.97
-2.04
2.67
0.62
1.43
-0041
1.45
Notes: HML= (l + ~oTotal Asset, + ~I Total Assets., + ~2 Total Assetit.2 + ~3Total Debt, +
~4Total Debt., + ~5Debtit.2+ ~6Total Asset=Dummy., + ~7Total Asset=Dummys., +
~8Total Asset=Dummyc., + ~9Total Debt=Dummy, + ~IOTotal Debt=Dummys., +
~II Total Debt=Dummys., + ~12GDPt + 'I1i+ 'I1t+ Eit
Where: 'I1iis an unobserved portfolio-specific effect and 'I1t captures any common
period-specific effects. Eitis the error term, which represents measurement errors in
the independent variable, and other explanatory variables that have been omitted. It
is assumed to be independently identical normally distributed with zero mean and
constant variance. A dummy variable taking the value I if the portfolio is value and
o if the portfolio is growth. Finally, the symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at
10%, 5% and I% respectively.
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implying that value portfolios have inverse relationship to the changes in total
asset. Finally, the coefficient for total debt interactive term is positive,
indicating value firms are positively related to changes in leverage. These
findings are consistent with our intuition that glamour firms have lower risk
because of their investment pattern.
3.5 ROBUSTNESS CHECK
We also reassess our hypothesis for the case of Malaysia, a small
emerging economy to check the robustness of our analysis. We choose
Malaysia because it has several unique and interesting attributes. First, as a
small open economy and trade reliant nation, it is highly exposed to the
economic health of its major trading partners. A classic example is the
impact of the recession in the United States (in early 2000), which caused
Malaysia to go through a period of sluggish economic growth. It has also
recently weathered a severe financial crisis, from mid of 1997 to the end
1998.
Malaysia also presents an interesting case study for several other
reasons. The institutional setting of Malaysian market is not similar to the
developed markets like the United States, United Kingdom or Japan, as it is
top heavy. The top 50 or 60 stocks, by market capitalisation, account for
most of the traded volume and index movement on any given day.
Furthermore, most of the stocks in the category are also state owned and
closely held. As a result, the volatility of the market is low, as compared to
, other regional markets.
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In addition, Malaysia has achieved a remarkable growth in managed
fund size in the last ten years. According to the Security Commission of
Malaysia, the total Net Asset Value (NAV) of investment companies nearly
doubled from RM 87.385 billion (USD 22.996 billion) in2004 to RM 198.217
billion (USD 59.51 billion) in 2010. This value represents 20 percent of the
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) market capitalization. Moreover,
there is an ongoing liberalization of the financial markets. This is attracting
significant interest from foreign fund managers and has further increased the
managed fund size in Malaysia. Therefore, the results of this study have a
direct implication for local and foreign fund managers.
In addition, unlike other regional emerging markets, Malaysia is the
only country to have capital control for a significant amount of time during
our study period. There is anecdotal evidence that Malaysian economic
system is established on a relationship based system (see Gomez and Jomo,
1997); a system that exhibits political patronage, cronyism and low levels of
transparency. Fraser et al. (2006) find that larger and more profitable
Malaysian firms with political patronage carry more leverage than the firms
with less political patronage."
Unlike the study on BTIC countries, the sample period covered for
Malaysia is from 1990 to 2008 which includes a sub-period with rapid
economic growth (1990-1996), followed by one with severe financial crisis
(1997-1998), and one with a post crisis recovery (1999-2008). Similar to
BTIC studies, our preliminary analysis shows that Fama and French three
41. We investigate this issue in the third chapter.
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factor model is adequate to capture the portfolio return for the Malaysian
market. Table 3.6a and 3.6b show that all alphas are not significant.
Table 3.6a
Fama and French Three Factor (FFTFM) for Weighted Monthly Excess
Returns on Six Portfolios formed on Size and BE/ME: Malaysia, 711990-
6/2008, 228 Months
Rpt-Rn = Cl + b (Rmt-Rn) +s 5MB + h HML +6
Portfolio BG BM BV SG SM SV
a 0.16 -0.48 -0.25 -0.30 -0.08 -0.05
t(a) 0.13 -0.25 -1.14 -1.20 -0.46 -0.33
b 0.88 0.98 0.97 1.01 0.88 1.05
t(b) 11.06 36.04 21.57 28.92 33.10 44.06
s -0.20 -0.14 0.06 1.15 0.87 0.71
t(s) -6.08 -3.74 0.77 23.91 23.66 21.60
h -0.20 0.21 0.63 -0.54 0.25 0.58
t(h) -3.79 5.15 7.40 -10.22 6.41 16.34
Adj R-squared 0.75 0.87 0.87 0.91 0.77 0.91
Notes: BIG, big to growth; BIM, big to medium; BN, big to value; S/G, small to growth;
S/M, small to medium, S/G, small to growth. Bold (t) statistics indicates that the
estimated coefficient is significant at 5%.
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Table 3.6b
FFTFM for Simple Monthly Excess Returns on Twenty-five Portfolios
formed on Size and BEIME: Malaysia, 7/1990-6/2008, 228 Months
Rpt-Rn = u + b (Rmt-Rn) +s 5MB + h HML +€
Size Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High
a t~a~
Small -0.63 -0.73 0.10 0.32 1.07 -1.64 -1.44 0.21 0.35 1.07
2 -1.41 -1.32 -1.00 -0.74 -0.58 -2.80 -4.61 -3.32 -2.13 -1.12
3 -1.92 -1.40 -1.04 -0.78 -0.77 -4.50 -4.00 -3.86 -2.45 -3.43
4 -1.97 -1.06 -1.24 -0.76 -1.12 -4.84 -3.38 -4.35 -2.47 -3.97
Big -0.71 -0.70 -0.89 -0.30 -1.26 -2.00 -3.30 -2.65 -1.06 -3.23
b t~b~
Small 0.96 0.98 0.79 0.90 1.09 17.99 13.84 13.90 6.91 7.81
2 0.87 0.88 0.80 0.89 0.82 12.42 15.03 18.94 18.57 11.20
3 1.06 0.99 0.94 0.99 1.02 18.23 20.16 16.38 22.35 15.81
4 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.93 1.02 16.47 20.67 21.13 21.65 18.02
Big 0.89 0.98 1.00 1.04 1.06 10.33 33.24 12.42 26.63 19.57
s t~s~
Small 1.29 1.11 0.78 0.99 0.91 17.46 11.41 6.85 5.51 4.72
2 0.80 0.74 0.84 0.91 0.71 8.29 9.43 14.51 13.71 6.99
3 0.78 0.58 0.51 0.47 0.52 9.76 8.69 5.78 7.66 6.00
4 0.18 0.18 0.27 0.33 0.36 1.79 3.12 4.37 5.57 4.07
Big 0.08 -0.15 -0.09 -0.98 0.04 0.90 -3.77 -1.25 -1.83 0.50
h t(h)
Small -0.41 -0.15 -0.21 0.21 0.23 -5.04 -1.39 -2.46 1.09 1.10
2 -0.37 0.06 0.32 0.49 0.20 -3.57 0.62 4.97 6.88 1.83
3 -0.18 0.25 0.21 0.39 0.45 -0.28 3.40 1.68 5.95 4.75
4 0.28 0.16 0.27 0.42 0.60 1.62 2.39 4.36 6.57 5.26
Big -0.13 0.15 0.17 0.36 0.51 -2.20 3.34 2.14 6.17 6.26
Notes: S refers to size and L to BE/ME. For instance SILl refers to lowest quintile in size
and BEIME. Bold (t) statistics indicates that the estimated coefficient is significant
at 5%.
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Our empirical analysis for Malaysia produces the following results.
Table 3.7a shows the average excess return on the six size-BE/ME equity
sorted portfolios for the full sample. The results show that the value
portfolios produced higher returns than the growth portfolios. For instance,
BV portfolio generates returns twice as much as the BG portfolio. We can
also observe similar differences in SV and SG portfolios. Meanwhile, Table
3.7b also demonstrates similar patterns in returns. The portfolios in the
lowest size quintile and the highest in BE/ME quintile generate the highest
return compared to other portfolios. This clearly indicates the presence of the
value premium in the Malaysian market.
Table 3.7a
Summary Statistics for Weighted Monthly Percent Excess Returns on
Six Portfolios formed on Size and BE/ME: Malaysia, 7/1990-6/2008, 228
Months
Portfolio RPTRFT Portfolio RPTRFT
BG 0.64* SG 1.27*
(1.28) (1.42)
BM 1.14** SM 0.50
(2.05) (0.36)
BV 1.57** SV 2.28**
(2.20) (2.60)
VMG 0.97
(2.65)**
Notes: BIG, big to growth; BIM, big to medium; BIY, big to value; S/G, small to growth;
SIM, small to medium, S/G, small to growth; VMG [{(SV+BV)/2}-{(SG+BG)/2}],
value minus growth, RPTRFT, return of a certain portfolio minus risk free rate. We
report one mean t-statistics with Ho=O and HI >0 in parentheses. The symbol *
indicate significance at 10%, ** at 5% while *** at 1%.
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Table 3.7b
Summary Statistics for Simple Monthly Percent Excess Returns on
Twenty-five Portfolios formed on Size and HElME: Malaysia, 7/1990-
6/2008, 228 Months
PT RPTRFT PT RPTRFT PT RPTRFT PT RPTRFT PT RPTRFT
SILl 1.58 S2Ll -1.09 S3Ll -0.19 S4LI -0.94 S5Ll -0.35
(1.25) (-1.32) (-0.21) (-1.26) (-0.70)
SIL2 0.69 S2L2 -0.08 S3L2 -0.05 S4L2 -0.42 S5L2 0.41
(0.76) (-0.10) (-0.06) (-0.59) (0.07)
SIL3 1.07 S2L3 0.52 S3L3 0.50 S4L3 0.14 S5L3 0.25
(1.23) (0.66) (0.61) (0.20) (0.41 )
SIL4 0.62 S2L4 0.80 S3L4 0.65 S4L4 0.43 S5L4 0.35
(0.65) (0.98) (0.82) (0.60) (0.52)
SIL5 4.02 S2L5 1.45 S3L5 0.70 S4L5 0.68 S5L5 0.54
(2.72) ( l.18) (0.85) (0.86) (0.69)
Notes: S refers to size and L to BE/ME. For instance SILl refers to lowest quintile in size
and BE/ME. RPTRFT, return of a certain portfolio minus risk free rate. We report
one mean t-statistics with Ho=O and HI >0 in parentheses.
Table 3.8 presents summary statistics of the characteristics of the
stocks in each group. Looking at all the five quintiles of Z-score, there seems
to be no apparent difference between low BE/ME and high BE/ME stocks.
For instance, the Z-score in the lowest quintile is 0.588 for low BEIME stocks
and 0.739 for high BE/ME stocks. Moreover, both types of stocks exhibit
similar scores as we move to the higher quintile, with the exception of the
highest quintile.
Meanwhile, Table 3.8 also shows that within the high BEIME group,
the average book-to-market ratio is higher for firms with a low Z-score than
firms with a higher Z-score, and conversely for the low BE/ME group. We
also find a firm's size to be inversely related with BE/ME and positively
related to Z-score. One might find this observation puzzling. However,
when looking at Malaysia's economic structure, where most of the big and
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successful firms are either state owned or politically connected, our results
then make more sense. This is due to the fact these finns have special
privileges to capture government-created rents through privatisation, licences
or contracts. For instance, Renong Bhd, a company with a direct link to the
ruling party, emerged as one of Malaysia's largest conglomerates (see
Gomez, 1994). Furthermore, market leverage is negatively related to both Z-
score and BE/ME. High BEIME firms have higher leverage than low BEIME
in all Z-score quintiles. Profitability is positively related with Z-score and
inversely related to BE/ME. Moreover, firms in low BEIME have higher
profitability than high BEIME from the third to fifth quintile of Z-score.
The rolling regression estimates of the Fama-French three factor
model for the full sample period are provided in Table 3.9a and 3.9b. The
results show BG and SG portfolios have negative coefficients, while BV and
SV have positive coefficients. We further test this model with the twenty five
size-BE/ME portfolios. Table 3.9b illustrates pretty much the same pattern.
Portfolios in the lowest quintile of BEIME have either negative loading or
small positive value. Meanwhile, portfolios in the higher quintile of BEIME
have higher positive loadings.
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Table 3.8
Summary Statistics of Firm Characteristics for Portfolios (Malaysia)
Sorted on BEIME and the Probability of Financial Distress.
Portfolio L M H Portfolio L M H
Z-score ROA
1 0.588 1.044 0.739 1 -0.039 0.003 0.021
2 2.404 2.384 2.453 2 0.013 0.051 0.037
3 4.438 4.175 4.133 3 0.056 0.070 0.054
4 9.705 9.976 12.536 4 0.091 0.079 0.084
5 36.995 34.459 27.248 5 0.071 0.109 0.061
HElME Leverage
1 0.309 0.852 2.111 1 1.814 1.773 2.219
2 0.372 0.824 1.884 2 0.908 0.896 1.102
3 0.392 0.822 1.771 3 0.366 0.473 0.572
4 0.357 0.796 1.651 4 0.162 0.194 0.293
5 0.368 0.835 1.865 5 0.068 0.081 0.116
Size Asset
I 707.81 569.46 610.97 1 1775.10 1533.66 1837.17
2 1234.57 400.93 451.71 2 2276.29 651.94 820.48
3 1645.31 613.41 730.51 3 1757.35 811.74 536.43
4 2339.92 1786.47 448.58 4 1810.52 1104.11 585.87
5 1342.18 530.58 596.07 5 589.68 521.31 530.02
Notes: KLSE firms from July 1991 to June 2008 are ranked independently every June based
on their values of the probability of financial distress (Z-Score) calculated using
Altman (1993) model. Leverage the ratio of total book assets less book equity to
market equity. Return on assets is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to
total book assets. Size is the market value of equity while asset is the total asset.
Both size and total assets are in million.
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Table 3.9a
Mean coefficient of rolling regression for six size-BE/ME portfolios
(Malaysia)
BG BM BV SG SM SV
constant 0.033125 0.03137 -0.42815 -0.42815 -0.15097 -0.15097
Rm-Rf 0.873151 1.005195 0.973935 1.058644 0.907441 1.066236
5MB -0.10504 -0.13366 0.130523 1.227393 0.888369 0.795085
HML -0.21266 0.206796 0.583823 -0.55531 0.211459 0.637569
Note: The coefficients are generated from rolling regression (36-month rolling window)
using FFTFM.
Table 3.9b
Mean coefficient of rolling regression for twenty-five size-BE/ME
portfolios (Malaysia)
Lt L2 L3 L4 L5 Ll L2 L3 L4 L5
Constant Market
SI -0.79 -0.76 0.41 -0.26 0.40 1.04 1.09 0.85 0.85 1.47
S2 -1.45 -1.37 -1.09 -0.49 -1.54 0.86 0.92 0.86 0.89 0.88
S3 -1.62 -1.28 -1.13 -0.77 -0.80 1.05 1.03 1.01 0.99 1.09
S4 -2.09 -1.10 -1.23 -0.72 -1.04 0.93 0.88 0.93 0.85 1.07
S5 -0.75 -0.81 -0.74 -0.29 -1.56 0.89 0.98 1.02 1.03 1.04
5MB HML
SI 1.34 1.22 0.71 0.85 1.44 -0.43 -0.21 -0.10 0.20 0.15
S2 0.99 0.78 0.79 0.74 0.72 -0.25 0.07 0.29 0.40 0.21
S3 0.70 0.54 0.45 0.46 0.53 -0.08 0.29 0.27 0.47 0.47
S4 0.29 0.19 0.29 0.25 0.36 0.38 0.25 0.28 0.44 0.64
S5 0.26 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 0.14 -0.08 0.17 0.15 0.35 0.46
Note: The coefficients are generated from rolling regression (36-month rolling window)
using FFTFM.
To provide further insight to our argument, we graph the coefficient of
HML of our twenty five size-BE/ME portfolios. Figures 3.101-3.125 exhibit
the pattern of time varying betas (coefficient of HML) for each portfolio. We
notice that value portfolios have higher coefficients than glamour portfolios.
In addition, the coefficients (HML) of value portfolios are more stable over
time, except during the financial crisis period. In contrast, the coefficients
(HML) of glamour portfolios are generally lower during the crisis and early
recovery period. However the coefficients increase significantly during the
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expansion period. This is consistent with our hypothesis that glamour firms
increase their business risk by undertaking the growth options.
[Insert Figures 3.101-3.125 here]
We further test this argument by estimating Equation 1 using the fixed
effect static panel data estimation technique. Table 3.10 shows the estimation
output for Equation 1. We notice the current variable has no significant effect
on the coefficient of HML except GDP. This is expected, as the changes in
the firm's policy are not immediate. Therefore, the interpretation of lag is
more appropriate in the context of our study.
We notice a significant difference between the coefficients for
glamour and value portfolios. In the case of glamour portfolios, lag of natural
logarithm of total asset has a positive impact on the coefficient of HML. 42 A
1 percent increase in total asset is estimated to have the effect on the
coefficient of HML by 0.22, which further strengthens our argument that
glamour firms increase their business risk by undertaking growth options.
However, we find the opposite impact for value portfolios. A 1 percent
increase in total asset is estimated to reduce the coefficient by of HML by
0.01. We also find that the lag of natural logarithm of total debt has a
positive impact on the coefficient of HML, but falls short of significance. In
nutshell, our findings on Malaysia support the findings the of our analysis on
BTIC countries.
42. Unlike BTIC countries, we only use lag one for Malaysia as we find lag two are not
significance.
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Table 3.10
Estimation output for Equation 1 (Malaysia)
Dependent Variables: HML
Independent Variables Coefficient
Constant -0.0113
Total Assets -0.1695
Total Assets (-1) 0.2222**
Total Debt 0.0630
Total Debt (-1) 0.0099
Total Assets*Dummy 0.0433
Total Assets*Dummy (-1) -0.2348*
Total Debt*Dummy -0.0312
Total Debt*Dummy (-1) 0.0431
GDP -0.0119**
-0.02
-1.91
2.49
1.52
0.26
0.34
-1.90
-0.52
0.77
-2.94
Notes: HML= a + ~o Total Asset, + ~I Total Asset.., + ~2Total Debt, + ~3Total Debts., + ~4
Total Asset=Dummy, + ~5 Total Asser=Dumrnyj, + ~6 Total Debt+Dummy., + ~7 Total
Debt=Dummys., + ~8 GDP! + 11i + 11!+ Ei!
Where: 11i is an unobserved firm-specific effect and 11! captures any common period-
specific effects. Ei! is the error term, which represents measurement errors in the
independent variable, and other explanatory variables that have been omitted. It is
assumed to be independently identical normally distributed with zero mean and constant
variance. A dummy variable taking the value I if the portfolio is value and 0 if the
portfolio is growth. The numbers in brackets are p-values. * indicate significance at
10% while ** at 5%.
3.6 CONCLUSION
A number of theories have been postulated to rationalize the source of
the value premium. However, the issue still remains controversial. In this
paper, we reassess this issue for the case of four emerging economies (i.e.,
Brazil, India, China and Turkey) with vast economic potential and Malaysia,
a small emerging economy with top heavy, closely held, state-owned
institutional setting. The main contribution of this paper is on rationalizing
. the value premium to economic fundamentals, attributing it to the investment
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pattern of the glamour firm. That is, glamour firms are likely to stockpile
capital, particularly in unfavourable economic climate. Whilst this limits
their exposure to risk, it negatively impacts on both their market valuation
and their returns.
In linking the risk and characteristics based models, this paper makes
an important contribution by reconciling the diverging neoclassical views of
FF (1995) and DT (1997). By demonstrating that distress risk is not the main
cause for the wide spread in expected return between value and growth stocks
but is rather a cause of the firm's unique characteristics, an important
development in the understanding of value is made. This is done by
illustrating that glamour firms have the unique characteristic of being
endowed with growth options. This entails capital outlay enhancing their
business risk and differentiating them from value firms. Value firms, by
contrast, have fixed assets that are used as collateral to lever up in order to
boost their earnings aggravating their financial risk. Our findings are
consistent with Chen et al. (2010) in suggesting the view of DT (1997), which
postulates that risk does not determine expected return, is exaggerated.
A further contribution IS In the reconciliation of the diverging
neoclassical and behavioral perspectives, by utilizing the Rational
Expectations perspective of Lucas (1978) as extended by Sargent (1987). In
our study, the range of options available to glamour firms provides a utility
('infatuation') in itself, separate from the monetary returns in the form of
capital gains and dividends. This inherent utility of glamour firms is
attractive to investors, causing an increase in their price with the subsequent
effect of reducing their returns.
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The hypotheses of this paper have been corroborated by the empirical
findings. Firstly, our preliminary analysis has shown that value portfolios
outperform glamour portfolios regardless of the formation technique. This
finding is consistent with several other studies on developed international
markets (see Chan et al., 1991; Capaul et al., 1993; and Fama and French,
1998). Secondly, by using the Altman Z-score, we found no evidence that
value stocks have a greater distress risk than glamour stocks, contradicting
the view of FF (1995). However, the evidence that value firms employ more
leverage than glamour ones reconciles the behavioral perspective of DeBondt
and Thaler (1985, 1987) with that of the neoclassical perspective of Merton
(1974). That is, the leverage behavior of value firms is akin to volatile
financial options, plummeting very fast during economic downturns and
rebounding equally fast upon economic recovery.
Thirdly, by expanding the perspective of DT, we observe that growth
portfolios have a lower risk. Our observation is based on the pattern of
coefficients (HML) generated from rolling regression analysis. Finally, using
static panel data analysis, we find that the coefficients (HML) of growth
portfolios are sensitive to the changes in total assets, reaffirming our belief
that the risk and return structure of growth firms is determined by their
investment pattern. All these findings substantiate our assertion that the value
premium is accredited to economic fundamentals.
We believe our paper provides further insights on the source of the
value premium, particularly in the context of the under-researched emerging
economies. Testing the same hypothesis in a developed market would be a
worthwhile basis for further investigation.
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Figures 3.1-3.25: Graphs Illustrating the Pattern of Coefficients (HML) for
Portfolios of Brazil formed on Size and BE/ME
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Figures 3.26-3.50: Graphs Illustrating the Pattern of Coefficients (HML) for
Portfolios of Turkey formed on Size and BE/ME
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Figures 3.51-3.75: Graphs Illustrating the Pattern of Coefficients (HML) for
Portfolios of India formed on Size and BEIME
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Figures 3.76-3.100: Graphs Illustrating the Pattern of Coefficients (HML)
for Portfolios of China formed on Size and BEIME
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Figures 3.101-3.125 Graphs Illustrating the Pattern of Coefficients (HML)
for Portfolios of Malaysia formed on Size and BE/ME .
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CHAPTER FOUR
4. DYNAMIC CAPITAL STRUCTURE
UNDER POLITICAL PATRONAGE: A
PRE- AND POST-CRISIS ANALYSIS
OF MALAYSIA
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The 1997 Asian financial crisis is a salient example when studying
theories around a firm's choice of optimal ownership structure. This is because
in this crisis many firms failed due to excessive debts, resulting in employees
losing their jobs and ultimately leading to the suffering of society at large. Many
theoretical and empirical studies have examined the firm-level optimal capital
structure, i.e. the choices of debt and equity that maximises the value of the
firm.43 The question of optimality is generally addressed by studying the
relationship between the firm's capital structure and its determinants. If firms
engage in optimising behaviour, then they must also be realigning towards a
particular target structure. This issue is of utmost important as sub-optimal
financial choices would either lead to potentially lower wealth or expose the firm
to bankruptcy.
43. See Harris and Raviv (1991) for different approaches on the issue of optimal capital
structure.
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This paper examines the determinants of the target capital structure of
Malaysian firms and the adjustment process towards this target in the pre and
post 1997 Asian financial crisis. The main objectives are to explicate the
changes in Malaysian firms' financing practices and quantify the adjustment
process towards the optimal capital structure. This, in turn, would demonstrate
the impact that the crisis has had in the context of the firms' financial policies. In
other words, it would demonstrate the lessons that the Malaysian firms have
learnt from the crisis. Moreover, this paper also examines the relationship
between a firm's characteristics and capital structure targeting behaviour, mainly
in the context of political patronage. We aim to investigate whether there is a
difference in a firm's choice of capital structure and its adjustment process
between firms with and without political patronage.
The main setting of this paper follows the central tenet of finance. That
is, market imperfections make financial decisions relevant and have a significant
impact on the value of a firm. Therefore, we argue that firms have a long term
target optimal capital structure which maximizes their value and they partially
adjust towards it when they deviate from it (see Strebulaev, 2007).44, 45 We also
see this paper emulating Fisman (2001), which illustrates that political patronage
44. In their well-known survey, Graham and Harvey (2001) find that 37% of their respondents
have a flexible target, 34% have a range of targets, and 10% have a strict target.
45. Strebulaev (2007) posits that in a dynamic economy, market frictions (e.g., transaction
costs) make full adjustment impossible resulting in the fact that most firms' leverages are
likely to differ from their target level. Therefore partial adjustment technique is widely
accepted as a tool to measure this process.
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IS a source of value for many firms." As a result, firms with political
connections may not put as much emphasis on their financial policy as they do
on rent seeking activities. This is illustrated empirically in Faccio (2006), who
finds a significant increase in a firm's value when politicians get appointed to
their boards or when their large shareholders enter politics or get elected to
public office.
Within this framework, we specifically address two research issues: (i)
did the Asian financial crisis have a significant impact on Malaysian firms'
financing policies? (ii) are there any distinct features in terms of financing policy
between firms with and without political patronage? We claim two contributions
in this paper. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to
investigate the impact of financial crisis on firms' financial policies using data
from an emerging market. Second, this study adds to the growing literature on
the role of political patronage in firms' financing strategies and their long-term
performance (see Johnson and Mitton, 2003, Suto, 2003; Khwaja and Mian,
2005; Faccio, 2006; Fraser et al., 2006; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; and Fan
et al., 2010).
To address our research questions we employ the partial adjustment
technique which is commonly accepted as a mechanism to empirically test the
46. In general, the source of value to firms with political connections include "preferential
treatment by government-owned enterprises (such as banks or raw material producers),
lighter taxation, preferential treatment in competition for government contracts, relaxed
regulatory oversight of the company in question, or stiffer regulatory oversight of its
rivals, and many other forms. However, as emphasized by Andrei Shleifer and Robert
Vishny (1994), politician themselves will extract at least some of the rents generated by
connections, and corporate value will be enhanced only when the marginal benefits of the
connections outweigh their marginal costs" (Faccio, 2006, p. 369).
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trade-off hypothesis. The data for relevant variables in this study is taken from
the DataStream and the sample period covered is from 1988 to 2009. We divided
our sample into two sub-periods as our main objective is to study the impact of
financial crisis on firms' financing policy. The first sample is the pre-crisis
period from 1988 to 1997, while the second is post-crisis from 2000 to 2009.
Our empirical analysis utilises an unbalanced panel dataset comprising
184 firms. We employ the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) technique
developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) to
estimate our model. Furthermore, we use the GMM difference estimator
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to check the robustness of our results.
We find the financial crisis has had a significant impact on the financial
policy of Malaysian firms. First, the adjustment rate towards the optimal capital
structure is higher after the financial crisis. Second, Malaysian firms have
adopted a more conservative attitude towards the choice of capital structure and
have a better way of dealing with bankruptcy risk. Third, we find some distinct
features between firms with and without political connections. The adjustment
rate for firms with political connections is higher than for firms without one. We
reckon this is due to the greater access to financing then available as the majority
of financial institutions are controlled by government (see Gomez and Jomo,
1997). Moreover, firms with political patronage have higher leverage. We
conjecture that this may be due to the fact that politically connected firms have
an informal support system from the government in case of financial distress.
Last but not least, our analysis synthesizes the well known Pecking Order and
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Static Trade-off theories, confirming the observation of Ebrahim and Mathur
(2011) that optimal capital structure is simply an amalgamation of both theories
in a framework of symmetric information.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 4.2 reviews relevant
literature, Section 4.3 presents our modelling framework and the methodology
used. Section 4.4 explains the proxy variables while Section 4.5 discusses the
data. Section 4.6 presents the results and analysis and section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW
4.2.1 Theory
The seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (MM) (1958) shaped the
framework in capital structure research. In their paper, they demonstrate that a
finn's financing choice is irrelevant in a perfect capital market. MM (1963)
extended their early work with the addition of market imperfection (such as
taxes) to illustrate that the firms' values are maximized at 100 per cent debt
financing. Nonetheless, this extreme observation of optimal capital structure is at
odds with firms' financial policies. Finns are not awash in debt and certainly do
not have 100 per cent debt financing. To shed light on this issue, Miller (1977)
introduced personal income tax into the MM (1963) model to make the theory
more realistic and representative of reality. This extended model suggests that
firms issue debt as long as the tax benefits of it at the corporate level is greater
than the liability of it at the personal level. Finns stop at a point where both are
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equal. This still yields an indeterminate capital structure at the firm level.
However, since the demand for debt equals the supply, there exists an overall
determinate capital structure in the economy.
Myers (1984), however, contends that the Miller (1977) model only
works when all firms face the same marginal tax. This is quite a strict
assumption. Nevertheless, Myers (1984) advances the Static Trade-off
hypothesis, where firms select capital structures that offset the benefit with the
cost associated with debt financing.V Consequently, empirical studies in capital
structure have employed proxy variables that determine a firm's optimal leverage
from its financial statements. The most common variables are a firm's
profitability, tangibility, investment opportunity, size and business risk."
Interestingly, the development of this theory has attracted a great deal of
attention in academia. Much of it centres on the validity of this theory.49
Jalilvand and Harris (1984) and Auerbach (1985) are among the early studies to
47. The benefits of borrowing arise from the interest tax shield (MM, 1963) and from
curtailing managers from squandering away a firm's free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). In
contrast, the associated cost of debt includes the agency cost of debt (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976 and Myers, 1977) and potential bankruptcy cost. Myers (2001), however,
argues that bankruptcy costs are included in the agency costs. He states that "conflicts
(meaning agency issues) between debt and equity investors arise when there is a risk of
default. If debt is totally free of default risk, debt holders have no interest in the income,
value or risk of the firm. But if there is a chance of default, then shareholders gain at the
expense of debt investors" (Myers, 2001, p. 96).
48. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) posit that liquidation values of assets in place also impacts on
the level of debt. This hypothesis is weIl supported empiricaIly by Benmelech et al.
(2005) and Brown et al. (2006).
49. This theory can be empiricaIly tested by estimating the mean reversion process towards
the optimal capital structure.
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empirically test this theory. 50 They find that firms make partial adjustments
towards their optimal target, and the speed of adjustment varies according to
firm size, type of debt and price of capital. These findings are further
corroborated in the more recent studies (see Hovakimian et al., 2001; Fama and
French, 2002; Leary and Roberts, 2005; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; and Kayhan
and Titman; 2007). The findings of these studies differ in term of speed of
adjustment. Nonetheless, they all concur that firms do have a target optimal debt
ratio and make partial adjustment toward it.51
While the trade-off hypothesis has provided useful insight to our
understanding of capital structure, not all firms observe it (see Graham and
Harvey, 2001). Therefore, several other theories have been put forward as
alternatives. One well accepted one is the Pecking Order theory developed by
Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf(l984). This theory posits that firms have a
preferred hierarchy for financing decisions due to asymmetric information. The
first preference is to use internal financing, and if then external funds are needed
the next preference is to use debt, followed by convertible securities, preferred
stock and common stock. According to Myers (1984), internal financing is the
most preferred financing as it carries the lowest asymmetric information.
Therefore, the pecking order of financing hierarchy implies that as profit
increases, the debt ratio will decrease due to the availability of retentions for
50. This is due to the fact that the target leverage is dynamic due to the changes in variables
that impact on optimal ownership structure. The speed of adjustment indicates whether
firms observe the optimal capital structure as suggested by the trade-off hypothesis.
51. In contrast, Baker and Wurgler (2002) illustrate that managers reveal insider information
by issuing stock when it is overpriced, i.e., when market-to-book ratios are higher.
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financing. There is empirical evidence to support this theory. For instance,
Titman and Wessells (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) find that firms with
lower debt ratios tend to have higher past profits. However, Frank and Goyal
(2003) illustrate evidence contrary to the Pecking Order theory. Myers (1977)
also concurs that firms which are endowed with growth options, opt for lower
debt ratio to avoid debt-holders from benefiting from the payoffs (of these real
options) on default.
The debate highlighting the theory behind a firm's financial behaviour is
still ongoing in the literature. Among the noteworthy studies that compare the
two theories are Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999); and Fama and French (2002).
The former finds evidence supporting the pecking order while rejecting the trade-
off hypothesis. In contrast, the latter not only finds partial evidence supporting
both theories but also illustrates the difficulty of disentangling the predications of
the two competing theories. To shed light on this puzzle, Ebrahim and Mathur
(2011) demonstrate in a rational expectation (symmetric information) framework
that both theories simply complement each other. Their theoretical model shows
that risky debt is at best Pareto-neutral to risk-free debt. This implies that low
agency cost instruments (such as risk-free debt) are more preferable, consistent
with Pecking Order Theory. Their study also illustrates that the subsequent
choice of financing is risky debt, echoing the Static Trade-off Hypothesis.
Therefore, in the context of the Ebrahim and Mathur (2011) study, Pecking Order
precedes Static- Trade-off as the welfare of agents depends on the type of
financing. This ranking is, however, contingent on the quality of assets employed
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by the firm, thereby confirming the prognosis of Shleifer and Vishny (1992). In a
nutshell, the Pecking Order and Static Trade-Off hypotheses work together rather
than being independent of each other.
4.2.2 Malaysian economy, political patronage and Asian financial
crisis
Malaysia is a multiracial country where the native Malays account for
sixty per cent of the population, while Chinese, Indians and other minor ethnic
groups account for the remaining forty per cent. The country gained
independence from Britain in 1957, a time of serious economic hardship and
extreme poverty due to the narrow focus on a natural resource based economy.
In addition, there was a socio-economic imbalance between the ethnic groups.
The Malays, despite being the majority, only owned three per cent of equity in
the economy.
To address these issues, the Malaysian government embarked on a series
of populist economic transformation programs. First, the government undertook
polices such as Import Substitution Industrialization (lSI) in the 1960s and
Export Oriented Industrialization (EOI) in the 1980s to industrialize the nation
(see Fraser et aI., 2006). These policies helped the country to become one of the
most industrialized areas in the region. Second, the government took a special
initiative to uplift the social status of the Malays and increase their participation
in business activities. The two main instruments used were the New Economic
Policy (NEP) from 1970 to 1990 and the National Development Policy (NDP)
124
from 1991 to 2000. The former policy was implemented in the aftermath of the
1969 racial riots, while the latter is simply the continuation of the former under a
new name. These populist polices gave special privileges to the Malays in term
of access to higher education and involvement in business activities, especially
on government projects. In term of specific targets, the aims were to increase the
overall Malay ownership from three per cent to thirty per cent and to reduce
poverty levels across all races to less than five per cent. The NEPINDP policies
of the Malaysian government were temporary measures to uplift the economic
status of the Malays. Currently, these policies are being gradually dismantled
and replaced with the New Economic Model (NEM), a policy that promotes fair
and equal opportunity to all races.
In pursuing its NEPf NDP policies, the Malaysian government chose to
adopt a "relation-based" capitalism where identified firms received political
patronage or special incentives. The policymakers believed that this was the best
way to accelerate the economy while addressing the issue of socio-economic
imbalance. This was due to the conviction that the Malays would not be able to
compete with the ethnic minorities without the support from government.
The political patronage in Malaysia has been practiced in three ways. 52
First, the government forms firms controlled through its sovereign wealth fund
called Khazanah Nasional. These firms are Government-Linked Companies
(GLCs) and are pivotal institutions in the Malaysian economy. For example,
Khazanah Holdings owns Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB), the only electricity
52. See Gomez and Jomo (1997) for a more detailed discussion.
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provider in Malaysia. Second, the patronage is given to firms substantially
owned by institutional investors sponsored by the government. For example,
Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB) was established to increase the corporate
ownership of Malaya." Last but not least, political patronage is the terms of
informal ties with the politicians. These are firms which are either owned by
relatives/friends of politician or politicians themselves through proxy.
These populist (but controversial) policies, infringing on the property
rights of minorities, have transformed the landscape of the Malaysian economy.
Today, Malaysia is one of the largest economies in the South East Asia region. It
is not only the biggest producer of crude palm oil, but also a major player in the
financial services, manufacturing and oil and gas industries. Nonetheless, the
success of the Malaysian economy has not come easily. The country has gone
through a number of financial crises. The most severe amongst these was the
Asian financial crisis from 1997 to 1999. This crisis started as a speculative
attack on the Baht currency in Thailand but spread quickly to the rest of the
region through its contagion.
The former Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamed put the
blame chiefly on foreign speculators. Nonetheless, a thorough review shows that
the financial practice of Malaysian firms is also to be blamed. Suto (2003)
demonstrates that prior to the crisis the financing of Malaysian firms was heavily
concentrated on external borrowings especially from banks. The study shows
that the borrowing from depository institutions ranged from fifty two per cent to
53. The structure of these institutions is similar to mutual funds.
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eighty two per cent of total external financing from 1990 to 1997, while the
issuance of new equity only ranged from eleven per cent to forty percent. In
addition, Schmukler and Vesperoni (2006) show that financial liberalization of
the Malaysian market in 1989 increased the long term debt of Malaysian firms.
We believe that the speculative attack on the Malaysian currency simply
triggered the inevitable; the crisis had been in the making for many years due to
the financial practice of firms.
Several arguments have been put forward to explain this phenomenon.
First, many firms, especially the ones with the political patronage, have easy
access to bank loans (see Borsuk, 1993). This is due to the fact that most of the
financial institutions in Malaysia are controlled by the government (see Gomez
and Jomo, 1997). In addition, bank loans are the cheapest form of financing.
Second, the bond market was not very well developed prior to the crisis. These
arguments, coupled with the fact that new equity is an expensive source of
financing, led Malaysian firms to go for higher debt financing, especially in the
form of bank loans.
The crisis had a severe impact on the Malaysian economy. The Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) contracted nearly six per cent in 1998, while the stock
market value decreased by nearly eighty per cent. Unlike other countries, the
Malaysian government chose to impose capital controls instead of taking a bail-
out from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In addition, the government
pegged the ringgit (Malaysian currency) to the US dollar. These steps were
taken to insulate the country's economy from further attacks from speculators
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and to assist the restructuring efforts. Furthermore, three government agencies
were set up to restructure the financial sector and balance sheets of Malaysian
firms. The Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC) was created to
restructure the debt, Danamodal to recapitalize the banks and finally Danaharta
to buy bad loans from banks. The Malaysian economy finally began to recover
in early 2000.
4.3 MODELLING FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
The optimal debt-equity ratio Y'it for the lh specific finn at time t is
described as follows.
Y'it= no + L ~jXjit+ ai + at + Cit (1)
Where: i represents firms ranging from 1 to N; while t denotes the time ranging
from 1 to T. X captures (J) finn-specific characteristics (proxy variables) which
vary with time and across firms (in a panel data structure). ai and at represents
unobserved finn-specific and time-specific effects variables. Cit is the error term
which is assumed to be independently identical and normally distributed with
zero mean and constant variance, i.e., Cit~ i.i.d. N ( 0, cr2)
In a perfect (i.e., frictionless) world with no adjustment costs, the finn is
expected to respond to a variation in the explanatory variables by changing its
existing leverage to equal its optimal leverage, i.e. a complete adjustment. This
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implies that at any point in time the leverage ratio of a firm equals its optimal
leverage, Y, = ylil Therefore, any change in leverage is exactly equal to the
change needed for the firm to be at its optimal leverage, i.e. Y, -Yil-I = Y', - Yil-I
However, in the real world with imperfect knowledge and adjustments
costs, the firm may not be able to adjust towards its optimal capital structure
instantaneously. That is, only a partial adjustment may be done. This can be
represented as below
(2)
Where: Ail is the coefficient of adjustment or the speed of adjustment. Equation
(2) can be rewritten as follows.
(3)
Substituting (1) into (3) in order to remove the unobservable optimal leverage
ylil, we get the following:
This is rewritten as:
Yil = <Po+ eoYil-I + I ej Xjil + Tli + TIl+ Ilil (5)
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Equation (5) is estimated using the Generalized Methods of Moments
(GMM) estimation technique. We chose this because the OLS method on
dynamic panel regression does not yield consistent estimators. This is attributed
to a possible correlation between the lagged endogenous variable and the
residuals in equation (5). There is also a possibility that the lag of endogenous
variables (in the model) may be related to the error terms. This may violate the
orthogonality condition. Chamberlain (1984) proposed a GMM estimator that
allows the regressors to be transformed to realize orthogonality with the error
terms. The GMM estimator is indeed the most efficient one within the class of
instrumental variable estimators.
In this paper, we employ the GMM system estimator developed by
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The reason behind
this is because it combines the regression in differences with regression in levels.
The instrument variables for the differences are the lagged levels, while for the
levels they are the lagged difference of the corresponding variables. The GMM
system estimator is more efficient as it addresses the problem of weak
instruments for the regression equation in differences (see Blundell and Bond,
1998). This is due to the assumption that the lagged values of the dependent
variable and the other explanatory variables are valid instruments with no serial
correlation in the error terms.
In testing these assumptions, we conduct two standard tests: (i) Sargan
test for over identifying restrictions; and (ii) Arellano-Bond for zero
autocorrelation in first-differenced errors. We also estimate the model using the
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GMM difference estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to check the
robustness of our results.
4.4 PROXY VARIABLES
In this paper, we use five proxy variables with the inclusion of dummy
variables to capture the effect of the political patronage. The selected proxies are
as followS:54,55
4.4.1 Leverage
This represents the debt ratio of firms. As proxies for leverage, we use
book value of debt ratios (total debt! total assets).56 Given that our main
objective is to measure the gradual adjustment process towards the optimal value,
we believe that the book value of debt ratio is more appropriate as a proxy than
market value. This is due to the fact that market value is quite volatile.
Therefore, it is unlikely for firms (subject to market frictions) to constantly adjust
their capital structure with a rapidly changing market value. Our choice is
54. Our definition of financial and accounting variables are in accordance with DataStream
5.0.
55. We do not use taxes as a proxy variable as the information on personal taxes of investors
is not available. We also have difficulty in constructing a proxy for non-debt tax shields.
56. Total debt represents all interest bearing and capitalized lease obligations. In contrast,
total asset represents the sum of total current assets, long term receivables, investment in
unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and equipment, and
other assets.
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supported by Flannery and Rangan (2006), who provide evidence on the
comparability of using both market and book ratios.
4.4.2 Business Risk (Volatility)
Finance theory posits that business risk is entailed by all businesses,
while financial risk is optional. This is due to fact that business risk arises due to
changing economic conditions. In contrast, financial risk results from firms
employing debt in their capital structure. Nonetheless, financial risk can
aggravate the very existence of a firm. In other words, financial risk exacerbates
business risk. This implies that business risk is negatively related to the leverage
ratio. We use the natural logarithm of total asset for volatility following the
argument of Fama and French (2002) that larger firms are likely to have less
volatile earnings and net cash flows. We also agree with them that estimating
volatility using time series data will limit our sample size.57
4.4.3 Profitability
Profitability IS another variable which has a significant impact on
leverage. Similar to size and growth, the literature suggests conflicting
predictions for the effect of profitability on leverage. The first prediction is
based on the argument of Myers and Majluf (1984). That is, profitable firms
57. Total asset may also be proxy for other factors. For instance, larger firms have fewer
problems with asymmetric information. They are likely to be more transparent than
smaller firms and thus have a lower agency cost of debt (see Fama and Jensen, 1983).
Fama and French (2002) suggest that size can also be a proxy for age and ease of access to
capital markets. Finally, Kurshev and Strebulaev (2006) demonstrate that size is a proxy
for fixed cost of financing.
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prefer to use internal funds for financing instead of issuing new debt or equity.
The rationale behind this argument is that firms with high profitability are able to
internally generate large amount of funds. They, thus, require a lower amount of
debt in their financing. This implies a negative relationship between profitability
and leverage. In contrast, Rajan and Zingales (1995) predict a positive
relationship as profitability enables firms to meet future financial obligations.
This is consistent with Jensen's (1986) free cash flow theory, which predicts that
profitable companies employ more debt as a mechanism to control their
managers. We use Earnings before Interest and Taxes/Total Asset as a proxy for
profitability.
4.4.4 Growth (Investment Opportunities)
The literature also suggests that a firm's growth rate has an influence on
their leverage level. Similar to profitability, the relationship between growth rate
and leverage can be either positive or negative. On the one hand, firms with high
growth rates are capable of issuing more debt than those with low growth rates,
implying a positive relationship between growth and leverage. This is due to the
fact that high growth rates signify the firm's ability to meet future financial
obligation.
In contrast, firms with high growth rates may opt for lower leverage ratio,
implying a negative relationship. This argument is based on Myers (1977), who
suggests that high leverage ratios limit firms' ability to undertake new investment
opportunity. Therefore, high growth firms would limit the leverage ratios to
protect their future growth options. Lemmon and Zender (2010) empirically
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confirm the prognosis of Myers (1977). Nonetheless, they argue that high
growth firms have low leverage ratios due to their lower debt capacity. We use
the market to book value ratio as a proxy for growth (see also Barclay and Smith,
1995).58
4.4.5 Tangibility
In general, firms with high tangible assets (such as plants and equipment)
can use them as the collateral for their debt. Scott (1977) demonstrates that firms
are able to borrow at lower interest rates if their debt is secured with these assets.
Thus, the relationship between tangibility and debt is expected to be positive.
For instance, Booth et al. (2001), in a study of 10 developing countries, find a
positive relationship between tangibility and firms' leverage. We use net
tangible assets/total assets as a proxy for tangibility. 59
4.4.6 Political Patronage
We use three criteria to classify firms with political patronage. First, we
use the work of Johnston and Mitton (2003) and Mitchell and Joseph (2010)
which are based on Gomez and Jomo (1997) to identify firms with infonnal
political connections." Second, we include firms which are under the control of
Khazanah Nasional. Finally, we incorporate firms under the institutional
58. Market value is defined as share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in
issue, while book value is defined as proportioned common equity. The market to book
ratio is also termed by financial analysts as Tobin's Q ratio (see Tobin, 1969).
59. Fixed assets represent property, plant, and equipment adjusted for accumulated
depreciation.
60. This approach has also been adopted by Johnson and Mitton (2003) and Mitchell and
Joseph (2010).
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investors sponsored by the Malaysian government (such as Permodalan Nasional
Berhad, Tabung Haji and Employee Provident Fund). We use dummy variables
to categorize firms with and without political patronage. Appendix II lists each
firm in our sample with their connection status and the nature of the connection.
4.5 THE DATA
The financial and accounting data were extracted from the DataStream
database from 1988 to 1997 for the pre-crisis period and 2000 to 2009 for the
post-crisis one. We purposely exclude the data during the crisis period as it is
extremely noisy. We utilize an unbalanced panel data set comprising of 184
firms which have data for both periods, in which 34 are classified as firms with
political patronage. The sample covers firms from all industries except the
financial sector.
Tables 4.1a and 4.1b provide some descriptive statistics for all variables.
The average leverage in the sample for the pre-crisis period is 20 per cent.
Interestingly, the ratio increased by almost 7 per cent to 26.9 per cent for the
post-crisis period. Even though this finding contradicts our expectation, we
undertake a detailed investigation to reveal the rationale behind it. Figures 4.1a
and 4.1b illustrate the pattern in leverage ratio for the pre and post crisis period.
We notice that the leverage ratio steadily increases from 15.25 per cent in 1988
to 27.3 per cent in 1997. This is roughly a 12 per cent increase in ten years. In
contrast, the leverage ratio in the post-crisis period decreases from 27 per cent in
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2000 to 20.5 per cent in 2009, with a transitory increase from 2002 to 2004.
These findings signify that Malaysian firms began to adopt a more conservative
approach in their financing by reducing their leverage in the aftermath of the
financial crisis.
Table 4.1a
Summary Statistics of Proxy Variables
(Pre-crisis and Overall sample)
LEVERAGE VOLATILITY TANGIBILITY GROWTH PROFITABILITY
Mean 0.1994 13.0010 0.4122 3.0605 0.0919
Maximum 2.8694 17.4718 0.9525 87.5313 0.5847
Minimum o 8.8843 o -77.7665
Std. Dev. 0.1921 1.3368 0.2352 6.8644
-0.7808
0.0877
Notes: LEVERAGE is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets, VOLATILITY is the
natural logarithm of total assets, TANGIBILITY is the ratio of fixed assets to total
assets, GROWTH is the ratio of market to book value, and PROFITABILITY is the ratio
of operating profits before taxes and interest to total assets.
Table 4.1b
Summary Statistics of Proxy Variables
(Post-crisis and Overall sample)
LEVERAGE VOLATILITY TANGIBILITY GROWTH PROFITABILITY
Mean 0.2689 13.4547 0.4142 1.0958 0.0493
Maximum 10.2731 18.4518 0.9670 37.7639 2.0074
Minimum o 7.7098 o -310.3986 -2.2482
Std. Dev. 0.4363 1.4471 0.2153 7.8090 0.1480
Notes: LEVERAGE is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets, VOLATILITY is the
natural logarithm of total assets, TANGIBILITY is the ratio of fixed assets to total
assets, GROWTH is the ratio of market to book value, and PROFITABILITY is the ratio
of operating profits before taxes and interest to total assets.
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Malaysian Firm Leverage in Pre-Crisis Period (from 1988 to 1997)
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Figure 4.2
Malaysian Firm Leverage in Post-Crisis Period (from 2000 to 2009)
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In the case of the other variables, volatility and tangibility are similar for
both periods. There is, however, a remarkable drop in profitability during the
post-crisis period. This is expected as the gross domestic product of Malaysia
retracted in the pre-crisis period. This is corroborated with a significant drop in
investment opportunities (i.e., growth) of firms.
In the context of political patronage, we find that firms with political
connection generally have a higher leverage ratio for both periods. Tables 4.1c
and 4.1d show that during the pre-crisis period, firms with political connections
have an average debt ratio of 23.2 per cent, while firms without political
connections have only 19 per cent. Based on Tables 4.1 e and 4.1 f, we observe a
similar pattern during the post-crisis period where the debt ratio of firms with
political connections increased to 32.7 per cent. In contrast, the debt ratio of
firms without political patronage only increased to 25.6 per cent. Nonetheless,
there are no sharp differences in profitability, tangibility, growth and volatility
between firms with and without political connections. We conjecture that one of
the possible reasons why firms with political patronage have a higher debt ratio is
due to the fact that their assets in place are informally supported by the
Malaysian government. This is consistent with the Shleifer and Vishny (1992)
hypothesis. In the case of economic downturns, the government is expected to
intervene to support these firms. Therefore, these firms have a better ability to
repay their debt in times of financial distress.
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Table 4.1c
Summary Statistics of Proxy Variables
(Pre-crisis and Firms without Political Connection)
LEVERAGE VOLATILITY TANGIBILITY GROWTH PROFITABILITY
Mean 0.1904 12.7675 0.4089 3.2064 0.0947
Maximum 0.9412 16.1283 0.9525 87.5313 0.5847
Minimum o 8.8843 o -77.7665 -0.3878
Std. Dev. 0.1751 1.2404 0.2280 7.6992 0.0859
Notes: LEVERAGE is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets, VOLATILITY is the
natural logarithm of total assets, TANGIBILITY is the ratio of fixed assets to total
assets, GROWTH is the ratio of market to book value, and PROFITABILITY is the ratio
of operating profits before taxes and interest to total assets.
Table 4.1d
Summary Statistics of Proxy Variables
(Pre-crisis and Firms with Political Connection)
LEVERAGE VOLATILITY TANGIBILITY GROWTH PROFITABILITY
Mean 0.2325 13.8573 0.4243 2.5255 0.0815
Maximum 2.8694 17.4718 0.9398 9.4604 0.3541
Minimum o 10.9554 0.0081 -1.9852 -0.7808
Std. Dev. 0.2420 1.3314 0.2600 1.4975 0.0938
Notes: LEVERAGE is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets, VOLATILITY is the
natural logarithm of total assets, TANGIBILITY is the ratio of fixed assets to total
assets, GROWTH is the ratio of market to book value, and PROFITABILITY is the ratio
of operating profits before taxes and interest to total assets.
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Table 4.1e
Summary Statistics of Proxy Variables
(Post-crisis and Firms without Political Connection)
LEVERAGE VOLA TILITY TANGIBILITY GROWTH PROFIT ABILITY
Mean 0.2555 13.2644 0.4095 0.9966 0.0471
Maximum 10.2731 18.4518 0.9670
Minimum o 7.7098 o
37.7639
-310.3896
2.0074
-2.2482
Std. Dev. 0.4265 1.3687 0.2124 8.5719 0.1510
Notes: LEVERAGE is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets, VOLATILITY is the
natural logarithm of total assets, TANGIBILITY is the ratio of fixed assets to total
assets, GROWTH is the ratio of market to book value, and PROFITABILITY is the ratio
of operating profits before taxes and interest to total assets.
Table 4.1f
Summary Statistics of Proxy Variables
(Post-crisis and Firms with Political Connection)
LEVERAGE VOLATILITY TANGIBILITY GROWTH PROFITABILITY
Mean 0.3273 14.2869 0.4349 1.5296 0.0589
Maximum 5.6646 18.0833 0.9549
Minimum o 9.9900 o
28.7423
-11.6388
2.4801
0.7234
-1.2724
Std. Dev. 0.4731 1.4882 0.2268 0.1338
Notes: LEVERAGE is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets, VOLATILITY is the
natural logarithm of total assets, TANGIBILITY is the ratio of fixed assets to total
assets, GROWTH is the ratio of market to book value, and PROFITABILITY is the ratio
of operating profits before taxes and interest to total assets.
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Tables 4.2a and 4.2b report the pair wise correlation between the
variables. A few points are noteworthy. Leverage is: (i) significantly related to
profitability and volatility at 5 per cent significant level, and (ii) related to growth
and tangibility at 10 per cent during both periods. The remarkable feature here is
the changes in the sign of correlation. In the pre-crisis period, leverage is
positively correlated with volatility and growth, while in the post-crisis period,
the correlation reverses to become negative. This provides further evidence that
Malaysian firms have become more conservative in their choice of capital
structure.
In the next step of our analysis, we aim to get a better idea of the
relationship between leverage and the proxy variables. Tables 4.3a and 4.3b
present the result of an exploratory econometric analysis where we regress
leverage on the five proxy variables with either panel fixed or random effect
regression." Unlike the pair wise correlation analysis, this econometric
technique illustrates the relationship between leverage and each proxy variable
while controlling for the effect of the other proxy variables.
For both periods, we use fixed panel effect regression as the Hausman test
shows that there are systematic differences in the individual coefficients. We
find that volatility is significantly related to leverage (with a positive sign) during
the pre-crisis period. In contrast, profitability is significantly related to leverage
(with a negative sign), while tangibility shows no significant relationship (despite
61. The choice between fixed and random is determined by the Hausman test.
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Table 4.2a
Correlation Coefficients of Proxy Variables
(Pre-crisis and Overall Sample)
LEVERAGE VOLATILITY PROFIT ABILITY GROWTH TANGIBILITY
LEVERAGE 1.0000
VOLATILITY 0.0733** 1.0000
PROFITABILITY -0.5173 ** 0.0280 1.0000
GROWTH 0.0597* 0.0010 0.0979* 1.0000
TANGIBILITY 0.0553* 0.0248 -0.0094 -0.0485 1.0000
Notes: LEVERAGE is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets, VOLATILITY is the
natural logarithm of total assets, TANGIBILITY is the ratio of fixed assets to total
assets, GROWTH is the ratio of market to book value, and PROFIT ABILITY is the ratio
of operating profits before taxes and interest to total assets. Finally, the symbols ***, **
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Table 4.2b
-Correlation Coefficients of Proxy Variables
(Post-crisis and Overall Sample)
LEVERAGE VOLATILITY PROFITABILITY GROWTH TANGIBILITY
LEVERAGE 1.0000
VOLATILITY
-0.1099** 1.0000
PROFITABILITY -0.2833** 0.1760* 1.0000
GROWTH
-0.0345* 0.0622* 0.1231* 1.0000
TANGIBILITY 0.0307* 0.1160* -0.0305 -0.0048 1.0000
Notes: LEVERAGE is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets, VOLATILITY the
natural logarithm of total assets, TANGIBILITY is the ratio of fixed assets to total
assets, GROWTH is the ratio of market to book value, and PROFITABILITY is the ratio
of operating profits before taxes and interest to total assets. Finally, the symbols ***, **
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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having positive coefficients). These findings simply substantiate our earlier pair-
wise correlation analysis.
Table 4.3a
Static Panel Regressions
(Pre-Crisis)
Fixed Random
Volatility 0.023*** 0.019***
(0.0 I) (0.00)
Profitability -1.334*** -1.315***
(0.06) (0.06)
Growth 0.000 0.001
(0.00) (0.00)
Tangibility 0.050 0.045
(0.04) (0.03)
Constant 0.004 0.066
(0.08) (0.07)
R-sqr 0.384 0.382
Notes: Leverage = CPo + 11 Volatility + 12 Profitability + 13 Growth + 14 Tangibility + 11i + 11t+J.1it
Where: 11i is a firm-specific effect, 11t captures any common period-specific effects and
J.1it is the error term representing measurement errors in the independent variable and
other explanatory variables that have been omitted. It is assumed to be independently
identical normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance, i.e., J.1it ~ i.i.d. N (0,
(2). LEVERAGE is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets, VOLATILITY the
natural logarithm of total assets, TANGIBILITY is the ratio of fixed assets to total
assets, GROWTH is the ratio of market to book value, and PROFIT ABILITY is the ratio
of operating profits before taxes and interest to total assets. Finally, the symbols ***, **
and * indicate significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% level.
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Table 4.3b
Static Panel Regression
(Post-crisis)
Fixed Random
Volatility -0.185*** -0.054***
(0.02) (0.01 )
Profitability -0.624*** -0.693***
(0.07) (0.07)
Growth 0.000 0.001
(0.00) (0.00)
Tangibility -0.029 0.053
(0.07) (0.06)
Constant 2.809*** 1.005***
(0.29) (0.15)
R-sqr 0.103 0.209
Notes: Leverage = <Po + YI Volatility + Y2 Profitability + Y3 Growth + Y4 Tangibility + T]i + T]t+
f.lit
Where: T]i is a firm-specific effect, T]t captures any common period-specific effects and
f.lit is the error term representing measurement errors in the independent variable and
other explanatory variables that have been omitted. It is assumed to be independently
identical normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance, i.e., f.lit ~ i.i.d. N (0,
02). LEVERAGE is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets, VOLATILITY the
natural logarithm of total assets, TANGIBILITY is the ratio of fixed assets to total
assets, GROWTH is the ratio of market to book value, and PROFITABILITY is the ratio
of operating profits before taxes and interest to total assets. Finally, the symbols ***, **
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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For the post-crisis period, we find that volatility is significantly related to
leverage (with a negative sign), while tangibility has an insignificant negative
link. In contrast, profitability consistently demonstrates a significant relationship
with leverage, with the same sign in both periods. A striking point that stands
out from this preliminary analysis is that profitability and volatility have the most
significant relationships with leverage. This is an indication that the Malaysian
firms' choice of capital structure depends mainly on their profitability and
business risk. Nonetheless, we need to highlight the fact that this analysis is only
exploratory and merely intended to shed some light on the link between leverage
and the proxy variables.
4.6 Economic Results
4.6.1 Main Analysis
The GMM system estimates and difference estimators of the dynamic
capital structure of equation (5) are provided in Tables 4.4a, 4.4b, 4.5a and 4.5b.
The main analysis of this study is based on the estimation on the GMM system
estimator since it addresses the problem of weak instruments. Before proceeding
to the analysis, we first subject the estimation to the relevant diagnostic tests (i.e.
the Sargan tests of over identifying restrictions and the Arellano-Bond test for
zero autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors). The results indicate no over-
identifying problem and autocorrelation for all estimations.
The prime interest of this study is in the coefficient of the lagged leverage
variable Yu.i. Our overall regression analysis in Tables 4.4a and 4.4b shows that
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Table 4.4a
Dynamic Panel Regression
(Pre-crisis)
GMM System GMM Difference
Leverage (-1) 0.518*** 0.450***
(0.02) (0.04)
Volatility -0.000 -0.009
(0.01 ) (0.01 )
Profitability -1.054*** -0.999***
(0.08) (0.10)
Growth 0.001 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00)
Tangibility 0.043 0.054
(0.04) (0.06)
Constant 0.162 0.274
(0.10) (0.16)
Sargan test 41.958 30.642
A -bond test(2Dd Order) 0.2410 0.1941
Notes: Leverage = <Po + Yo Leverage (-I) + YI Volatility + Y2 Profitability + Y3 Growth + Y4
Tangibility + 11i + 11t + flit
Where: 11i is a firm-specific effect and 11t captures any common period-specific effects.
flit is the error term representing measurement errors in the independent variable and
other explanatory variables that have been omitted. It is assumed to be independently
identical normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance, i.e., flit:::: i.i.d. N (0,
02). LEVERAGE is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets, VOLATILITY the
natural logarithm of total assets, TANGIBILITY is the ratio of fixed assets to total
assets, GROWTH is the ratio of market to book value, and PROFIT ABILITY is the ratio
of operating profits before taxes and interest to total assets. Finally, the symbols ***, **
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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Table 4.4b
Dynamic Panel Regression
(Post-Crisis)
GMM System GMM Difference
Leverage (-1) 0.496*** 0.456***
(0.01 ) (0.01 )
Volatility -0.497*** -0.287***
(0.02) (0.03)
Profitability -0.695*** -0.603***
(0.06) (0.05)
Growth 0.012 0.013*
(0.01 )
Tangibility 0.071
(0.01 )
0.028
(0.04) (0.04)
Constant 6.908*** 4.030***
Sargan test
(0.25)
85.576
(0.39)
69.082
A-Bond test (2nd Order) 0.3204 0.3104
Notes: Leverage = <Po + Yo Leverage (-I) + YI Volatility + Y2 Profitability + Y3 Growth + Y4
Tangibility + 1]i + 1]t + flit
Where: 1]i is a firm-specific effect and 1]t captures any common period-specific effects.
flit is the error term representing measurement errors in the independent variable and
other explanatory variables that have been omitted. It is assumed to be independently
identical normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance, i.e., flit ~ i.i.d. N (0,
(2). LEVERAGE is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets, VOLATILITY the
natural logarithm of total assets, TANGIBILITY is the ratio of fixed assets to total
assets, GROWTH is the ratio of market to book value, and PROFITABILITY is the ratio
of operating profits before taxes and interest to total assets. Finally, the symbols ***, **
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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in the pre-crisis period the coefficient's value is 0.51, implying that Malaysian
firms made an approximately 49 per cent partial adjustment towards optimal
capital structure. There seems to be only a marginal improvement in the post-
crisis period with an adjustment rate increase of 2 per cent.
Our further regression analysis with interaction variables in Tables 4.5a
and 4.5b demonstrate a significant difference between pre and post crisis periods.
In the pre-crisis period, the coefficient's value is 0.71 for firms without political
patronage, implying that these firms make about 29 percent partial adjustment
towards their optimal capital structure. The scenario, however, is completely
different in the post-crisis period, where the coefficient value of variable Y;t-I is
0.52. This means that the coefficient of adjustment is 0.48, implying that firms
make 48 per cent partial adjustment towards the optimal capital structure.
In the case of firms with political patronage we observe higher adjustment
rates for both periods in contrast to firms without political patronage. This is
illustrated by the negative coefficient of the interaction variable. Nonetheless,
the adjustment rate is slightly lower for the post-crisis period. Since our sample
mainly comprises of firms without political patronage, we conclude that
Malaysian firms have realized the importance of adjusting their capital structure
towards the optimal level. We believe that the firms' managers have
acknowledged the cost of being off target as relatively high compared to the cost
of adjusting the debt ratio.
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Table 4.5a
Dynamic Panel Regression
(Pre-crisis)
GMM System GMM Difference
Leverage (-1) 0.713*** 0.594***
(0.05) (0.05)
Volatility 0.017 0.014
(0.01) (0.02)
Profitability -0.791 *** -0.737***
(0.11 ) (0.11 )
Growth 0.002** 0.001
(0.00) (0.00)
Tangibility 0.163** 0.128
(0.06) 0.08)
Political Patronage 0.986**
(0.33)
Politics*Volatility -0.038 -0.046
(0.02) (0.02)
Politics*Profitability -0.952*** -0.958***
(0.17) (0.19)
Politics*Growth -0.021 ** -0.022**
(0.01) (0.01)
Politics*Tangibility -0.304*** -0.199
(0.08) (0.10)
Politics* Leverage (-1) -0.618*** -0.595***
(0.08) (0.08)
Sargan test 40.954 30.526
A-Bond test (20d Order) 0.1883 0.1398
Notes: Leverage = <Po + Yo Leverage (-I) + YI Volatility + Y2 Profitability + Y3 Growth + Y4
Tangibility + Y5 Political (Pol) + Y6 Pol*Volatility + Y7 Pol*Profitability + Ys Pol*Growth
+ Y9 Pol*Tangibility + YIO Pol=Leverage.j, + 'Ili + 'Ilt + Ilit·
Where: 'Ili is a firm-specific effect and 'Ilt captures common period-specific effects. Ilit is
the error term representing measurement errors in the independent variable and other
explanatory variables that have been omitted. It is assumed to be independently
identical normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance, i.e., Ilit ::::i.i.d. N (0,
(2). LEVERAGE is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets, VOLATILITY the
natural logarithm of total assets, TANGIBILITY is the ratio of fixed assets to total
assets, GROWTH is the ratio of market to book value, and PROFITABILITY is the ratio
of operating profits before taxes and interest to total assets. Finally, the symbols ***, **
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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Table 4.5b
Dynamic Panel Regression
(Post-Crisis)
GMM System GMM Difference
Leverage (-1) 0.518*** 0.461 ***
(0.01 ) (0.01 )
Volatility -0.462*** -0.176***
(0.03) (0.04)
Profitability 0.501 *** -0.440***
(0.07) (0.06)
Growth 0.010 0.011
(0.01 ) (0.01 )
Tangibility -0.096 -0.034
(0.08) (0.07)
Political Patronage 1.023
(0.66)
Politics*Volatility -0.127** -0.317***
(0.05) (0.05)
Politics*Profitability -1.673*** -1.426***
(0.10) (0.09)
Politics*Growth -0.025* -0.027**
(0.01 ) (0.01 )
Politics*Tangibility 0.677*** 0.529***
(0.12) (0.11 )
Politics* Leverage (-1) -0.117*** -0.037*
(0.02) (0.02)
Sargan test 93.180 63.821
A-Bond test (2nd Order) 0.2864 0.2859
Notes: Leverage = CPo + Yo Leverage (-I) + YI Volatility + Y2 Profitability + Y3 Growth + Y4
Tangibility + Y5 Political (Pol) + Y6 Pol*Volatility + Y7 Pol*Profitability + Y8 Pol*Growth
+ Y9 Pol*Tangibility + YIO Pol=Leveragec., + Tli + TIt+ !lit
Where: Tli is a firm-specific effect and TItcaptures any common period-specific effects.
!lit is the error term representing measurement errors in the independent variable and
other explanatory variables that have been omitted. It is assumed to be independently
identical normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance, i.e., !lit;:::: i.i.d. N (0,
<l). LEVERAGE is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets, VOLATILITY the
natural logarithm of total assets, TANGIBILITY is the ratio of fixed assets to total
assets, GROWTH is the ratio of market to book value, and PROFITABILITY is the ratio
of operating profits before taxes and interest to total assets. Finally, the symbols ***, **
and * indicate significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% level.
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On the determinants of the capital structure, our overall regression
analysis shows that only profitability is found to be highly significant at the 1per
cent level for the pre-crisis period, while other proxy variables have no
significant relationship with leverage. In the post-crisis period, profitability and
volatility are significant at the 1 per cent level while tangibility and growth are
found to be non-significant variables. Profitability shows the highest
significance and is negatively related to leverage in both periods. While the
observation seems to be consistent with the Pecking Order Theory of Myers
(1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984), it contradicts that of Rajan and Zingales
(1995) and Jensen (1986). This is due to the fact that Malaysian firms prefer to
use internal equity as this financing method has zero floatation cost and
minimum asymmetric information problem.
In the case of volatility, finance theory postulates a positive relationship
between stability of earnings and leverage in the sense that managers should be
able to finance debt when the earnings are stable. Nonetheless, this study finds
the relationship between leverage and volatility to be different between pre and
post crisis periods. In the pre-crisis period, we find the relationship to be non-
significant, confirming with the study of Annuar and Shamser (1993), while in
the post-crisis period, we find the relationship to be negative and statistically
significant. Even though this is not in accordance with our expectation, we
conjecture that even firms with stable earnings have become more conservative
in their financing.
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Our further analysis confirms the direct link between political patronage
and capital structure during the pre-crisis period. Finns with political patronage
carry more debt than firms without political patronage. However, their link is not
significant during the post-crisis period. In terms of interactive proxy variables,
we find an indirect relationship between political patronage and capital structure
through the proxy variables. Profitable firms with political patronage appear to
carry less debt than firms without political patronage for both periods. Another
point that stands out is that tangibility is negatively related to leverage for firms
with political patronage during the pre-crisis period. This indicates that firms
with political connections had access to financing without collateral at that time.
This situation, however, changes during the post-crisis environment where
tangibility has a positive relation with leverage. This shows that conservatism
prevailed in this environment, illustrated by the improvement in the financial
practice of firms with political connections.
In a nutshell, our analysis illustrates that the crisis has had significant
impacts on the Malaysian firms' financing policies. These findings indicate that
Malaysian firms have become more conservative in their financial policies. For
instance, a negative coefficient of volatility during the post-crisis period indicates
that even firms with stable earnings prefer to have lower debt ratios. Indeed, the
crisis has a significant impact particularly in the way firms deal with bankruptcy
risk based on the higher partial adjustment rate towards optimal capital structure
after the financial crisis. Moreover, political patronage is no longer linked to
capital structure in the post-crisis period. No doubt the current strategy put
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Malaysian firms in a more stable position in contrast to the pre-crisis period.
Perhaps this safer choice of financing could be one of the reasons why Malaysian
firms remain unscathed during the subprime crisis.
Our analysis not only illustrates the significant impact of the Asian
financial crisis on the Malaysian firms' capital structure but also synthesizes the
Pecking Order and Static Trade-off theories (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf,
1984). We show that profitability is the most significant variable that determines
the debt ratio with a negative relationship confirming the Pecking Order Theory.
Our results also confirm the trade-off hypothesis as we observe the partial
adjustment process toward the optimal capital structure. This confirms the
theoretical results of Ebrahim and Mathur (2011) which reflect the amalgamation
of Pecking Order and Static Trade-off hypothesis in a rational expectations
framework.
4.6.2 Robustness Check
We also estimate equation 5 using the GMM difference technique to
support our main analysis. The dissimilarity in this estimation technique is the
exclusion of the dummy variable due to the process of differencing.
Nonetheless, the overall results remain similar, with the exception of the impact
of tangibility during the pre-crisis period. Unlike the previous analysis, we find
that tangibility is no longer significantly related to leverage.
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4.7 CONCLUSION
This paper examines the determinants of the target capital structure of
Malaysian firms and the adjustment process towards this target during time
periods pre and post the Asian financial crisis. We explicate the association of
leverage with four firm-specific variables: tangibility, profitability, investment
opportunity (i.e., growth), and business risk. We also investigate whether there
are differences in a firm's choice of capital structure and its adjustment process
based on the presence of political patronage. Using a panel sample of 184 firms,
we estimate the determinants of the firms' leverage and quantify the adjustment
process using the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) system estimator
technique.
Our empirical analysis illustrates the following results. First, we
demonstrate that the rate of adjustment process for Malaysian firms is higher
after the financial crisis, implying that the firms' managers have acknowledged
the cost of being off target is relatively high compared to the cost of adjusting the
debt ratio. We also find that the leverage ratio, despite having a higher average
during the post-crisis period, shows a decreasing trend. In a nutshell, our
analysis provides evidences that Malaysian firms have become more
conservative in choosing their choice of financing. This indicates that the
financial crisis has had a general positive impact on the financial practice of
Malaysian firms.
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Second, we illustrate the distinct impacts of the financial crisis on firms
with and without political connections. We find that firms with political
connections have higher adjustment rates in both periods. We conjecture that
this may due to fact that they have greater access to financing. Another
interesting point is that firms with political connection have become more
sensible in their choice of capital structure after the financial crisis. This is
pointed out by the positive relationship between tangibility and leverage after the
financial crisis, implying that these firms have initiated using collateral for
borrowing. This further reaffirms our argument that Malaysian firms,
irrespective of ownership structure (i.e., with or without political connections),
have become more conservative when it comes to managing their capital
structure.
Last but not least, our analysis synthesizes the amalgamation of the well-
known Pecking Order and Static Trade-off theories of Ebrahim and Mathur
(2011). We show that Malaysian firms' choice of debt ratio mainly depends on
their profitability with a negative relationship, confirming the Pecking Order
theory. In addition, we observe the Static Trade-off hypothesis as indicated by
the significant partial adjustment process in our analysis. We also conjecture that
firms with political patronage may have more debt due to the fact that their assets
in place have the strong backing of government. Consequently, these firms have
a better ability to pay their debt in the case of financial distress.
We believe our paper has provided an insight to understanding the impact
of the Asian crisis on the financial practice of firms (in the context of emerging
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markets and relation-based economies). This can provide a clue on how firms in
the developed markets will probably evolve from the contagion of the current
subprime crisis.
156
Appendix II: Politically Connected versus Unconnected firms in our
sample
Politically connected firms
Gomez and Firms Politically
No. Company Jomo (1997) Khazanah owned by unconnected
Nasional sponsored firms
criteria institutions
1 ADVANCE SYNERGY BHD X
2 AIC CORPORATION BHD X
3 ALUMINIUM COMPANY X
4 AMALGAMATED IND'L X
5 AMCORPPROP X
6 ANCOM BERHAD X
7 BATU KAWAN BERHAD X
8 BERJA YA LAND BHD X
9 BERJA YA SPORTS TOTO X
10 BOUSTEAD HEAVY X
11 BOUSTEAD HOLDINGS X
12 BREM HOLDING BERHAD X
13 BRITISH AMERICAN
TOBACCO X
14 CAHYA MATA SARAWAK X
15 CARLSBERG BREWERY X
16 CHEMICAL COMPANY X
17 CHIN TECK PLANTATION X
18 C.l. HOLDINGS BERHAD X
19 COMPUTERFORMSBHD X
20 CONCRETE ENGINEERING X
21 CYCLE & CARRIAGE X
22 DAIBOCHI PLASTIC X
23 DOLOMITE
CORPORATION X
24 DRB-HICOM BERHAD X
25 DUTALAND BHD X
26 DUTCH LADY MILK INDU X
27 EASTERN PACIFIC X
28 ECOFIRST CONSO BHD X
29 EG INDUSTRIES BHD X
30 EKOVEST BERHAD X
31 EKSONS CORP BHD X
32 ENGTEKNOLOGIHLDGS X
33 ESSO MALAYSIA BERHAD X
34 FABERGROUPBERHAD X X
35 FACB INDUSTRIES INC X
36 FAR EAST HOLDINGS X
37 FCW HOLDINGS BERHAD X
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38 FIMA CORPORATION BHD X
39 FITTERS DIVERSIFIED X
40 FRASER & NEA VE X
41 GAMUDA BERHAD X
42 GENTING BERHAD X
43 RESORTS WORLD BHD X
44 GENTING PLANTATIONS X
45 GEORGEKENTBERHAD X
46 GLENEAL Y PLANT ATIONS X
47 GOH BAN HUAT BERHAD X
48 GOLDEN PHAROS
BERHAD X
49 GOPENG BERHAD X
50 GRAND CENTRAL X
51 GUINNESS ANCHOR BHD X
52 HAP SENG CONSOLIDATE X
53 HEXZA CORP BHD X
54 HIL INDUSTRIES BHD X
55 HIROT AKO HLDGS BHD X
56 HO HUP CONSTRUCTION X X
57 HONG LEONG INDUS BHD X
58 HUBLINEBHD X
59 IJM CORPORATION BHD X
60 INCH KENNETH KAJANG X
61 INSAS BERHAD X
62 INTEGRA TED LOGISTICS X
63 INTEGRATED RUBBER X
64 101 CORPORATION BHD X
65 IREKA CORPORATION X
66 JAVABERHAD X
67 JAY A TIASA HLDGS BHD X
68 J.T. INTERNATIONAL X
69 KECK SENG (M) BHD X
70 KESM INDUSTRIES BHD X
71 KFC HOLDINGS BERHAD X
72 KlAN JOO CAN FACTORY X
73 KIM HIN INDUSTRY BHD X
74 KONSORTIUM LOGISTIK X
75 KPJ HEALTHCARE BHD X
76 KRET AM HOLDINGS BHD X
77 KUALA LUMPUR KEPONG X
78 KUANT AN FLOUR MILLS X
79 KULIM (MALAYSIA) BHD X
80 KUMPULAN JETSON BHD X
81 KYM HOLDINGS BHD X
82 LAFARGE MALAYAN X
83 LANDMARKS BERHAD X
84 LEADER UNIVERSAL X
85 LEONG HUP HOLDINGS X
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86 LIEN HOE CORPORATION X
87 LINGUI DEVELOPMENTS X
88 LION CORP BERHAD X
89 LION DIVERSIFIED X
90 LION FOREST IND X
91 LION INDUSTRIES X
92 MALAYAN FLOUR MILLS X
93 MALA YAN UNITED INDS X
94 MALA YSIA AICA BERHAD X
95 MALAYSIA PACKAGING X
96 MALAYSIAN AIRLINE X X X
97 MALAYSIAN PACIFIC X
98 MALA YSIAN RESOURCES X X
99 MALP AC HOLDINGS BHD X
100 MAMEE-DOUBLE DECKER X
101 MARCO HOLDINGS BHD X
102 MAXBIZ CORPORATION X
103 MBM RESOURCES
BERHAD X
104 MELEW AR INDUSTRIAL X
105 MENTIGA CORPORATION X
106 MERCURY INDUSTRIES X
107 MINHO (M) BERHAD X
108 MISCBHD X
109 MMC CORPORATION BHD X
110 MTD ACPI ENG BHD X
III MUDA HOLDINGS
BERHAD X
112 MUHIBBAH ENGINEERING X
113 MULPHA
INTERNATIONAL X
114 MWE HOLDINGS BERHAD X
115 NEGRI SEMBILAN OIL X
116 NESTLE (MALAYSIA) X
117 NYLEX (MALAYSIA) BHD X
118 OCBBERHAD X
119 OLYMPIA INDUSTRIES X
120 ORIENTAL HOLDINGS X
121 PAN MALAYSIA CORP X
122 PAN MALAYSIA HLDGS X
123 PAN MALAYSIAN X
124 PANASONIC MFG X
125 PANSARBHD X
126 PARKSON HOLDINGS X
127 PELIKAN INT'L CORP X
128 PERAK CORP BHD X
129 PERUSAHAAN SADUR X
130 PETRONAS DAGANGAN X
131 PETRONAS GAS BERHAD X
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132 BEST WORLD LAND BHD X
133 PJ DEVELOPMENT HLDGS X
134 POLY GLASS FIBRE (M) X
135 POS MALAYSIA BHD X X
136 PPB GROUP BHD X
137 PRESS METAL BERHAD X
138 PROLEXUS BERHAD X
139 PROTON HOLDINGS BHD X X
140 PUBLIC PACKAGES HLDG X
141 RELIANCE PACIFIC BHD X
142 ROCK CHEMICAL X
143 SAM ENGINEERING X
144 SAPURA RESOURCES BHD X
145 SAPURACRESTPETROL X
146 SARA WAK OIL PALMS X
147 SCIENTEX BERHAD X
148 SHANGRI-LA HOTELS X
149 SHELL REFINING CO X
ISO SIN HENG CHAN X
151 SINO HUA-AN INTL X
152 SINOTOP HOLDINGS BHD X
153 SOUTHERN STEEL BHD X
154 SPK-SENTOSA CORP X
155 STAR PUBLICATIONS X
156 SUNW AY HOLDINGS BHD X
157 SUPER ENTERPRISE X
158 TAN CHONG MOTOR X
159 TASEK CORPORATION X
160 TDMBERHAD X
161 TEBRAU TEGUH BHD X
162 TELEKOM MALA YSIA
X X
BHD
163 TENAGA NASIONAL BHD X X
164 TEO GUAN LEE CORP X
165 STORE CORPORATION X
166 THETA EDGE BHD X
167 TIME ENGINEERING BHD X X
168 TIONG NAM LOG HLDGS X
169 TRADEWINDS CORP BHD X
170 TRADEWINDS (M) BHD X
171 TRIPLCBHD X
172 TSM GLOBAL BERHAD X
173 UACBERHAD X
174 UMW HOLDINGS BERHAD X
175 UNITED MALACCA BHD X
176 UNITED PLANTATIONS X
177 UTUSAN MELA YU X
178 WIJAYA BARU GLOBAL X
179 WING TAL MAL X
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180 WTK HOLDINGS BHD X
181 YEE LEE CORPORA nON X
182 YEO HIAP SENG X
183 YTL CEMENT BERHAD X
184 ZELANBHD X
Note: The table lists all firms in our sample with and without political connection. The criteria
for politically connections are based on: (i) the work of Gomez and Jomo (1997); (ii)
firms under the control of Khazanah Nasional; and (iii) firms under the institutions
sponsored by the Malaysian government such as Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB),
Employee Provident Fund (EPF) and Tabung Haji (TH).
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CHAPTER FIVE
5. CONCLUSION
5.1 OVERVIEW
By means of these three essays, this thesis makes valuable
contributions regarding several issues in finance literature. The first essay
analyses the value growth puzzle in the rational expectation framework. In
doing so, it provides theoretical explanations on some of the controversial
issues within the portfolio theory literature. In rationalising the value growth
puzzle, the essay explicates the reasons behind the fallacy of the well-known
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), while shedding light on the issue of
stock price volatility.
The second essay provides empirical analysis of the value growth
puzzle. In contrast to previous studies, this essay attributes the value
premium to economic fundamentals using data from five emerging markets.
Furthermore, the essay makes important contributions, by reconciling the
diverging views not only within the neoclassical literature but also between
neoclassical and behavioural literature.
Finally, the third essay examines the impact of the financial crisis on
firms' financial practice. It investigates this issue in the context of Malaysia,
an emerging market in which political patronage plays an important role. The
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results demonstrate that the financial crisis had a significant impact on the
financial policy of Malaysian firms, and supports the amalgamation of the
well-known Static Trade-off hypothesis and Pecking Order Theory.
5.2 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS
The three essays have provided interesting and insightful findings to
further enhance our understanding of finance, particularly on portfolio and
capital structure theories.
The first essay demonstrates that agent heterogeneity in terms of
taxable and non-taxable investors leads to invalidation of Tobin's two fund
separation theorem, thus nullifying the CAPM. This is due to the rivalry
between these two agents that demarcates the efficient frontier into two
distinct patterns. The difference in firm's characteristics (in terms of value
versus growth) and the risk profile of agents yields two distinct Capital
Market Lines (CMLs). A flatter CML slope can be observed when the net
lender in the aggregate economy is a non-taxable agent. In contrast, a steeper
slope is observed when the net lender is a taxable agent. This clarifies the
issue as to why CAPM - which was built on the notion of a single beta - does
not adequately explain cross sectional differences in stock returns. The actual
CML differs from the theoretical CML due to the heterogeneity of agents in
the economy. In the case of the value growth puzzle, a value premium is
observed when the true CML is flatter, reflecting the dominance of taxable
agents and vice versa.
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The second essay provides a new economic insight into the value
premium puzzle. Empirical research reveals the tendency of glamour firms to
hoard cash and delay the undertaking of their growth options especially in
uncertain economic environments. Whilst this behaviour mitigates business
risk, it also lowers their market valuation, driving down their returns,
explicating the underlying reason for value premium. The findings also
provide a means to reconcile the existing explanations for value premium.
From a neoclassical viewpoint, our results reconcile the findings of Fama and
French (FF) and Daniel and Titman (DT). The observation of firms' unique
characteristics made by DT and FF providing evidence of distress risk are in
fact similar but identified in a different way.
Meanwhile, in the context of aligning neoclassical and behavioural
perspectives, we put forward two possible explanations. The first concerns,
the endowed option of glamour as identified by Sargent (1987), where firms
entice investors to pay a premium in price, which lowers their return.
Second, the volatile nature of value firms' leveraged equity aggravates their
losses in a poor economic climate, but leads to a rebound in prices as the
economic situation improves. This clarifies the over-reaction hypothesis of
DeBondt and Thaler (1985 and 1987).
Finally, the third essay studies the impact of the financial crisis on
firms' financing practices by focussing on different ownership structures, in
this case, firms operating with or without political patronage. It also sheds
light on the intriguing debate between the Static Trade-off and Pecking Order
Theories, two well-known hypotheses behind a firm's financial behaviour.
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The study finds that the financial crisis has had a positive impact on
the financing practice of Malaysian firms irrespective of ownership structure.
This was based on the higher adjustment process towards an optimal capital
structure in the post-crisis period and a significant reduction in leverage. This
is further supported by the changes in coefficient of the determinants of the
target capital structure, indicating the conservatism of Malaysian firms after
the financial crisis. For instance, the changes in the coefficient of volatility
(business risk) from positive to negative in the aftermath of the crisis
indicates that even firms with stable earnings preferred to have lower debt
ratio. Also, the changes in the coefficient of tangibility for firms with
political patronage from negative to positive implies that collateral is required
for financing despite the privilege of having political connections. Finally,
the significance of profitability with a negative relationship with debt ratio,
and the presence of the partial adjustment process provide evidence In
synthesising the well-known Pecking Order and Static Trade-off Theories.
5.3 FURTHER RESEARCH
The findings of these three essays have a significant impact on the
future direction of research in finance. The first essay demonstrates that asset
pricing is contingent on classification of firms and risk profile of investors
due to the presence of taxes. This, in turn, challenges the fundamental
assumptions of the Capital Asset Pricing Model and all its applications,
including the notions of investment appraisal, use of the Jensen Alpha and
shareholder value analysis (SVA) that mainly depends on the accuracy of
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CAPM. In the case of investment appraisal, CAPM estimates the hurdle rate
that determines the rejection or acceptance of a project. Thus, any
underestimation [overestimation] causes the acceptance [rejection] of projects
being considered. With regards to the Jensen Alpha, the computation of
excess return based on the existing theoretical CAPM may not be accurate as
it does not take into consideration the dynamic nature of true beta line. The
inaccuracy in the Jensen Alpha measurement will have a significant impact
on SVA.
The second essay provides a new economic intuition in understanding
the source of value premium. Nonetheless, the analysis undertaken is limited
to data from emerging markets. Testing the same intuition in the context of a
developed market should present an interesting opportunity to further
enhance the transferability and reliability of our findings. A similar direction
of research applies to our third essay. Due to data limitation, this study was
confined to relatively large publicly listed companies. Hence it is not clear
how some of the major findings generalise to small and medium sized
unlisted companies. Data permitting, it would therefore be interesting to
investigate the capital structure-political patronage nexus in the context of
these companies, in view the significant role they play within the Malaysian
economy.
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